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i 
Abstract 
The last six months of the Trump administration witnessed interesting 
developments regarding its legacy in the Middle East. The normalization of ties between 
four Arab states and Israel constituted major breakthroughs not only in the regional inter-
state relations but also for the American foreign policy in the region. 
In this context, this thesis offers insights into how to understand and evaluate the 
administration’s approach towards these developments. Based on systematic and 
empirical research, I analyze a corpus comprised of Trump-era foreign policy documents 
regarding the Iranian and Israeli-Palestinian questions. I find, firstly, that the Trump 
administration pursued a strategic shift in the American foreign policy in the Middle East. 
This shift marked the confrontational “Maximum Pressure” campaign towards Iran and 
the top-down approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict embodied in the “Peace to 
Prosperity” plan. Secondly, I find that the Trump administration engineered a geopolitical 
transformation by pushing the Arab regimes towards a multi-faceted security alignment 
with Israel. As a theoretical framework, I apply Ryan’s ‘regime security’ theory to 
Trump's approaches towards Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Finally, I conclude 
that the Trump administration set the stage for a more favorable containment of Iran as 
the US continues to disengage from the region. It may have even facilitated a return to a 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Over the last decades, the US administrations have tried to contain the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict1, obviously with different 
approaches and outcomes. As far as the American foreign policy under the Trump 
administration in the Middle East is concerned, certain scholars and analysts 
acknowledge that there was a shift in the way the policies were conducted, 
nevertheless, the description of this shift remains a matter of contention. Gingrich 
(2017) argues that this shift is “Titanic” (para. 1) and “decisive” (para. 8). Along 
similar lines, Quamar (2018, p. 273) views it as “significant” and “visible” in the 
region. Yet, by contrast, it is advanced that the Trump administration did neither have 
clear foreign policies (Walt, 2018; Zakaria, 2020) nor a strategy in the Middle East 
(Cook, 2020). 
Drawing on the literature in the field, there seems to be a gap in the knowledge 
in terms of the examination of Trump’s legacy in the Middle East especially after the 
end of the Trump mandate. In light of the recent and consecutive breakthroughs in 
inter-state relations in the region, it is undeniable that the normalization of ties 
between Israel and four Arab states opened a space of discussion in the research field 
on how to develop a greater understanding and a more thorough evaluation of the 
Trump-era foreign policies. In fact, it was the Trump administration that triggered and 
sponsored the train of normalization with Israel. Therefore, the importance of the 
 
1 This research acknowledges the sensitive nature of the Israeli-Palestinian question. Quite aware of the 
different interpretations surrounding the topic, I adopt the more standard framework in the literature 
since the focus of this research is to examine the Trump administration’s approach to the issue and not 







Trump endeavors in bridging the gap between UAE, Bahrain, and Israel in addition to 
the fact that all these states perceive Iran as a common threat has not been well 
addressed yet in the scholarly works leaving wider questions with regard to how to 
better approach the Trump’s legacy in the region.  
So, to what extent did the American foreign policy in the Middle East under 
the Trump administration change? And how did this shift affect transformations in the 
region? 
1.2 Thesis Statement 
This thesis argues that the Trump administration pursued a strategic shift in 
the American foreign policy in the Middle East that could potentially change the 
geopolitical landscape in the region. This research has two objectives. The first 
objective is to describe and examine this strategic shift that revolved around two 
pillars: US policies towards Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In relation to the 
former, the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the Iran Nuclear Deal 
and opted instead for a confrontational muscular campaign of “Maximum Pressure”. 
That was clearly a different approach from the Obama administration’s 
rapprochement with Iran. Similarly, the recent Arab-Israeli peace agreements and the 
possible ongoing multiple-track negotiations were a result of yet another different 
approach of the Trump-era foreign policy in the Middle East. This indicated another 
considerable departure from the previous stances of US administrations towards the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one that is marked by a top-down approach. Accordingly, 
I suggest that the importance of this shift on both axes should not be overlooked. 







thoughtful, and masterful strategy that was well calculated and executed by the Trump 
administration. 
Concerning the second objective of this thesis, I attempt to evaluate the 
implications of these two Trump-era policies at the geopolitical level in the Middle 
East. I contend that the Trump administration engineered a geopolitical 
transformation that better fits US disengagement from the region. This transformation 
is primarily based on a GCC-Israeli security alignment, so strategic for the United 
States to further contain Iran’s influence in the region. This security alignment may 
represent even a stepping stone towards a return to an ‘Offshore Balancing’ strategy 
in the long term. Indeed, according to the Abraham Accords, the security field 
constitutes an instrumental element in the cooperation between UAE and Bahrain, and 
Israel. It opens doors for access to territories, intelligence, joint military training, and 
military and technological partnerships, to name a few. In light of this new regional 
security alignment, I suggest Ryan’s (2009, 2015) ‘regime security’ as an insightful 
theoretical approach through which Trump’s legacy in the Middle East could be 
understood and evaluated.  
1.3 Research Contribution 
The reconciliation between four Arab states and Israel in 26 years created 
fresh areas for researchers to better approach Trump’s legacy in the Middle East from 
dimensions the literature paid little attention to. This research contributes to the 
exploration of the role of the Trump-era foreign policies in the Arab-Israeli 
rapprochement especially in light of rallying US allies to confront Iran’s growing 
influence in the region. It offers insights into the implications of the strategic shift in 







on GCC-Israeli security alignment. In a nutshell, in light of the unprecedented 
rapprochement between some of the Arab states and Israel, and the shared interest by 
US allies in containing Iran and its proxies, this thesis hopes to better examine the 
Trump-era foreign policies in the region which proves its importance and significance 
in the research field. 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
This thesis proceeds as follows. In the first section of the second chapter, 
‘Historical background and literature review’, I outline the US approaches towards 
Iran since the discovery of its nuclear program and prior to the Trump administration. 
In the second section, I equally outline the US approaches towards the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict before the Trump era. These two sections, relevant to the first 
research question and objective, are crucial for my discussion, based on my research 
findings, of the strategic shift in the American foreign policy under the Trump 
administration.  
In the third section, I shed light on some of the relevant literature that 
addresses Trump’s legacy in the Middle East with certain works having favorable 
views while others are rather pessimistic and critical of Trump’s legacy. A third block 
in the literature just points out particular frameworks through which the Trump-era 
policies in the region could be understood. The fourth section charts the evolution of 
US strategies in the Middle East. Finally, the fifth section tackles the literature 
pertaining to the transformation that the Middle East has recently witnessed. These 
sections relate to my second research question and objective. They are also crucial for 
my discussion of the implications of the strategic shift in the Trump-era policies on 







In the third chapter, I explain the methodology that will be used in this 
research. To demonstrate the strategic shift in the American foreign policy in the 
Trump era and its geopolitical implications, a corpus representative of different genres 
of Trump-era foreign policy documents, will be subject to qualitative content analysis. 
As a theoretical framework, I attempt to use Ryan’s (2009, 2015) ‘regime security’ 
theory to discuss how the Trump administration approached the insecurity of the Arab 
regimes to push them towards an Arab-Israeli security alignment. In the fourth 
chapter, ‘Results’, I feature the findings of the research, and then, in the ‘Discussion’ 
chapter, I analyze and interpret them. 
In the concluding chapter, I sum up how my corpus findings indicated that the 
American foreign policy in the Middle East underwent a strategic shift under the 
Trump administration. This was carried out mostly through a unilateral approach, 
often inconsistent with international norms, towards both the Iranian and the Israeli-
Palestinian questions. Furthermore, my inferences suggest that this strategic shift 
aimed to alter the geopolitical landscape and advance a security alignment between 
the GCC regimes and Israel to swing the balance against Iran and its allied groups—in 
line with the US disengagement from the region. My conclusion also suggests that an 
Arab-Israeli2 security alignment could facilitate the return to an ‘Offshore Balancing’ 













Chapter Two: Historical background and literature review 
In this chapter, I showcase the US approaches, prior to the Trump era, towards 
Iran’s nuclear program and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In relation to the Iranian 
question, the literature suggests that US stances were mostly premised on multilateral 
cooperation, negotiation, and dialogue. Concerning the Israeli-Palestinian question, 
the literature also shows the US initiatives put forward to resolve the chronic conflict 
were mostly in accordance with international norms and consensus. Furthermore, I 
present the literature regarding Trump’s legacy in the Middle East, the evolution of 
US strategies towards the region, and the transformations that the latter has 
undergone. 
2.1 US approaches towards Iran’s nuclear program before the Trump 
administration 
It is true that as soon as Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons came to the light, the 
US took an assertive approach towards Iran. Yet gradually it pursued a diplomatic 
approach based on cooperation with the international community, especially the 
European allies. There even existed certain occasions where the US pursued a 
rapprochement with Iran. Whenever Iran chooses to be defiant to international 
concerns, it faces concerted multilateral sanctions pushed by the US, its allies, and the 
international community. In what follows, I outline some of the most important 
stances that punctuated US approaches towards Iran prior to the Trump 
administration. 
Byman and Moller (2016) contend that the prevention of the spread of nuclear 
weapons represents one of the fundamental US interests in the Middle East. Iran is 







East. President George. W. Bush, in his State of the Union message in 2002, included 
it, along with Iraq and North Korea, in the “axis of evil” that “threaten[s] the peace of 
the world” (The White House, 2002b, para. 21). John Bolton, former US Ambassador 
to the UN under the Bush administration, in his testimony before the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the US House of Representatives in 2011, posits that Iran is prone 
to irrationality and will not be influenced by the “calculus of deterrence” claiming that 
“A theocratic regime that values life in the hereafter more than life on earth is not 
likely to be subject to classic theories of deterrence….” (As quoted in Miller & Bunn, 
2013, p. 16). It is in this context that the US deems the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons as a major threat to its national security and interests. For its part, Iran 
considers it vitally important to acquire nuclear weapons to protect its own national 
security, although it always stresses its program is used for peaceful purposes 
(Fitzpatrick, 2006). Dueck and Takeyh (2007) point out that one of the explanations 
of Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons is the fact that two of its neighboring states 
endured regime change by the use of force at the hands of the Bush administration. 
In addition to the Iran Hostage Crisis, the discovery of Iran’s nuclear program 
was a tipping point in worsening the relations between the US and Iran. Whilst, in 
December 2002, the international community found out that Iran managed to build 
two nuclear facilities, in Arak and Natanz, in August 2003, inspectors from IAEA 
confirmed that they discovered enriched uranium “at rates superior to what is 
necessary for civilian use” (Security Council Report, 2020, 26 August 2003 section). 
Notwithstanding sticking to the negotiation track with the international community 
regarding Iran, El-Khawas (2005) argues the Bush approach was so assertive, and 







out the resort to military power against Iran to defend US interest and security. As he 
puts it, the administration invariably “threatened to take the matter into its own hands” 
(p. 29) given it was in a mood of unilateralism and regime change in the region.  
Yet El-Khawas points out that, during the second term, the Bush stance 
remarkably changed “becoming more conciliatory and favoring negotiations” (pp. 32-
33) emphasizing the importance to work closely with the European allies to persuade 
Iran to eschew a nuclear path. Dueck and Takeyh (2007) affirm that the Bush 
administration pursued in its second term a multilateral diplomatic path based on 
negotiation. In their words: 
The EU was initially encouraged by Washington to put a number of economic 
and diplomatic carrots on the table in order to induce Iran to negotiate. Iran's 
response was so gratuitously uncooperative that the United States was able to 
win limited economic and weapons-related sanctions against Iran from the UN 
Security Council in December 2006. (p. 201) 
In 2006, when officially rejecting a deal proposed by the EU+3, Iran endured 
numerous UN sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. From 2006 to 2015, a 
range of UNSCRs was adopted regarding Iran’s nuclear issues: 1696, 1737, 1747, 
1803, 1835, and 1929. Interestingly, the arrival of the Obama administration sparked 
new prospects for the diplomatic impasse. Wechsler (2019, p. 27) highlights how 
President Obama, in his Cairo Speech in 2009, invited Iran for diplomatic talks over 
its nuclear ambitions. President Obama said: “my country is prepared to move 
forward without preconditions” understandably knowing that “any nation – including 
Iran – should have the right to access peaceful nuclear power if it complies with its 







important for Wechsler is that President Obama “downplayed” US assertive portrayal 
of Iran as a rogue regime that sponsors terrorism by simply referring to it as one that 
“played a role” in spreading violence. Indeed, this is indicative that the Obama 
administration eschewed confrontational rhetoric with the Iranian regimes hoping that 
this would ease the tensions and pave the way for a diplomatic breakthrough. 
Meanwhile, the US continued to impose its own sanctions on Iran, targeting an 
array of sectors ranging from energy to arms to banking (Katzman, 2021). Similarly, 
the EU reinforced its own economic sanctions on Iran, including a full ban on Iranian 
oil exports, in retaliation to Iran’s suspension of oil exports to the United Kingdom 
and France in 2012. (Security Council Report, 2020). Despite the severity of 
sanctions, Iran did not seem to be deterred from moving ahead with its nuclear 
program. Indeed, by 2015, the Obama administration recognized that Iran possessed 
“a uranium stockpile” able “to create 8 to ten nuclear bombs” (The White House, 
2016, para. 7).  
Yet 2015 marked a breakthrough not only for US diplomacy but also for the 
entire international community in solving one of the most pressing issues in the 
Middle East. Indeed, the Obama administration reached a deal with Iran regarding its 
nuclear program. Formally referred to as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA), the deal, also commonly known as Iran Nuclear Deal, was signed by the 
US, Iran, the EU, France, Germany, the UK, Russia, and China. The deal stipulated 
that Iran halts its nuclear program for at least 10 years in exchange for having the 
international community lifting the economic sanctions imposed on Iran (U.S. 
Department of State, 2015). On the importance of the deal, President Obama stressed 







and security of the world” (The White House, 2015, para. 1). Fitzpatrick (2015) 
affirms that the JCPOA is “A Good Deal” (p. 1). For its part, the United Nations 
welcomed the agreement with the then Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon describing it 
as “historic” (UN News, 2015, para. 2). In this regard, in 2015, the UN Security 
Council unanimously adopted UNSCR 2231 which endorsed the JCPOA. It is worth 
noting that UNSCRs 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, and 1929 were all terminated 
with the adoption of UNSCR 2231 (Arms Control Association, 2017).  
The accord has been strongly criticized by different parties for a myriad of 
reasons, however. Ben-Meir (2014) summarizes the concerns of the critics about the 
Iran Nuclear Deal. Firstly, opponents of the agreement argue that this rapprochement 
with Iran regarding its nuclear program came at a cost which was the unchecked and 
continuous expansion of Iran in the region. This implied that Iran would benefit 
tremendously from an economic standpoint since foreign investment would pour into 
Iran, which in turn could be potentially translated into further support of regional 
actors notably Hezbollah and Hamas. In the same respect, after 10 years, Iran would 
have sufficient financial resources to embark on another accelerated program of 
nuclear weapons. Secondly, it is also argued that the inspection process was loose and 
gave Iran a major leeway to cheat. For instance, Ben-Meir writes: “despite Iran’s 
assurances to address UN concerns including the Parchin military site, it did not agree 
on the intrusive inspection regime that the International Atomic Energy Agency 
requires to ensure that Iran’s programme is peaceful” (para. 23). Put simply, certain 
pundits argue that Iran cannot be trusted.  
Regarding the regime sanctions, certain scholars and analysts question their 







counterproductive by pushing Iran to speed up its nuclear enrichment. By way of 
example, Gordin and Nephew (2017) point out that, under the effects of the sanctions, 
Iran increased the enrichment level from 5% to 20%. Moreover, the number of 
centrifuges also jumped from 3000 to 22,000 with the construction of more 
sophisticated and rapid ones. Furthermore, it built another enrichment plant in Fordo 
(as cited in H. Mousavian & M. Mousavian, 2017). 
In a nutshell, prior to the Trump administration, the US pursued a multilateral 
approach that considerably used dialogue and negotiation, to contain Iran’s program 
of nuclear weapons. Multilateralism and diplomacy were advanced in the second term 
of the Bush administration and took momentum during the Obama tenure. It is 
undeniable that the path toward US rapprochement with Iran was fraught with a 
plethora of constraints, but the US continued to cooperate with the rest of the 
international community to address Iran’s nuclear aspirations. Particularly, it 
continued to work closely with its EU allies until it reached the JCPOA. This was 
remarkably reversed with the Trump administration. 
2.2 The US approaches towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict before the Trump 
administration 
In this section, I shall outline the peace initiatives put forward by the US to 
resolve the longstanding Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Prior to the Trump mandate, the 
US administrations suggested several plans that were relatively in concurrence with 
the international consensus that punctuated the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
In 1978, the Carter administration was deeply involved in the peace talks 
between Egypt and Israel which led to the famous Camp David meeting in the US. 







peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979. Dubbed the Camp David Accords: The 
Framework for Peace in the Middle East, the peace treaty insisted that genuine and 
durable peace between the Arab neighboring states and Israel should be “based on 
Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts” (National Archives, 2021, 
para. 10). In 1982, President Ronald Reagan presented his administration's peace plan 
in a public speech in September 1982. The Reagan Middle East Initiative signaled the 
US longstanding support for the security of Israel but also highlighted “the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements” (para. 24). He stressed the 
importance of compliance with UNSCR 242 which he described as “wholly valid” 
and that “in return for peace, the withdrawal provision of Resolution 242 applies to all 
fronts, including the West Bank and Gaza” (para. 32). Equally important, President 
Reagan pointed out that the US stance “on the extent to which Israel should be asked 
to give up territory will be heavily affected by the extent of true peace and 
normalization, and the security arrangements offered in return” (para. 32). On the 
question of settlement, President Reagan called for “the immediate adoption of a 
settlement freeze by Israel” (para. 28) in an attempt to inject a dose of confidence in 
the Arab parties to initiate serious talks. Regarding the refugee issue, he said: 
“Palestinians feel strongly that their cause is more than a question of refugees. I 
agree” (para. 24). Finally, concerning the final status of Jerusalem, President Reagan 
stated that only negotiations should solve the dispute, although he emphasized that the 
city “must remain undivided” (United Nations, 1982, para. 31). It is worth noting that 
before President Reagan suggested his plan, there was another peace initiative called 







Arabia. The plan, comprising eight major points to resolve the conflict, was based on 
UNSCRs 242 and 338, and the pre-1967 borders (Razvi, 1981). 
For his part, President George. H. W. Bush suggested a peace plan, in a speech 
before the Congress in March 1991, which revolved around the spirit of UNSCR 242. 
Interestingly, the American foreign policies under the first Bush administration 
underwent a significant shift from the Reagan administration regarding its support to 
Israel. The then-Secretary of State James Baker exercised pressure on the Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to put an end to the Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. He went as far as to warn the Israeli government that, in case 
the settlement activities were not halted, the US would not ensure that Israel obtains 
loan guarantees worth $10 billion to absorb Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet 
Union. Eventually, this led to acute tensions between President Bush and PM Shamir 
(Tessler, 2020). The Office of the Historian (2016a) corroborates that “The failure of 
the plan, combined with sharp U.S.-Israeli exchanges over Israeli settlement-building 
in the occupied territories, strained relations between Bush and Shamir” (para. 4).  
When it comes to the Clinton era, it is interesting that, at the beginning of its 
mandate, the Clinton administration relatively pursued a top-down approach to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict but failed. The administration tried to strike a peace deal 
between Israel and Syria prioritizing it over a direct solution between the Israelis and 
the Palestinians. The Clinton administration thought it would be more practical to find 
common grounds between Israel and Syria as the former could easily withdraw from 
the Golan Heights, which was not the case for the West Bank due to its complexity. 
The rationale behind prioritizing neighboring states to Israel over the Palestinians was 







a peace agreement with Israel. In light of this, the Clinton administration oriented its 
focus and efforts to an Israel-Syria agreement and managed to bridge the gap in the 
negotiation before it reached a dead end due to disagreement on to what extent would 
Israeli withdraws from the Golan Heights (Office of the Historian, 2016b). 
During 2000, the Clinton administration made a few diplomatic attempts 
before leaving office. Of paramount importance is the Camp David II initiative hosted 
by President Clinton in July. The Clinton offer revolved around three major pillars. 
The first one was that the future Palestinian State will encompass the entire Gaza Strip 
and more than 90% of the West Bank. The second one proposed that Palestinians will 
be granted control over The Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem. The third 
pillar was a considerable recompensation for the refugee issue. Although the 
negotiations lasted a couple of weeks, the outcomes fell short of the expectations 
(Rosenberg, 2011). In light of the failure of Camp David II, the Clinton administration 
crafted another initiative known as the “Clinton Parameters”. President Clinton 
insisted that if the new offer, in line with Resolutions 242 and 338, is not accepted, it 
will vanish when his mandate is over. Presented in his meeting with the Israeli and 
Palestinian delegations on December 23, 2000, President Clinton’s new proposal 
envisioned a Palestinian state comprising of between 94 and 96% of the West Bank 
territories, in addition to an exchange of between 1 and 3% of Israeli territories as a 
recompensation for the Israeli settlements in West Bank. Regarding Jerusalem, while 
the Palestinians will exercise sovereignty over the Haram, the Israelis will exercise 
sovereignty over the Western Wall. Concerning the refugee question, President 
Clinton “believe[s] that Israel is prepared to acknowledge the moral and material 







its cooperation with the rest of the international community regarding “compensation, 
resettlement, rehabilitation, etc” (United States Institute of Peace, 2001, p. 2). 
Under the George W. Bush administration, a new multilateral initiative to 
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict saw the light. Dubbed the ‘Road Map for 
Peace’, also known as the ‘Road Map’, the peace plan was developed by the United 
States, the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia. Referred to as “the 
quartet”, these parties worked for hand in hand and endorsed a two-state solution 
based on previous UN Security Council resolutions. The initiative was first suggested 
by President Bush in a speech delivered on June 24, 2002, in the Rose Garden. 
President Bush was hopeful that “the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 will be 
ended through a settlement negotiated between the parties, based on U.N. Resolutions 
242 and 338, with Israeli withdrawal to secure and recognize borders” (para. 20). 
Regarding the question of Jerusalem, President Bush said that both parties must work 
together to settle their disputes about Jerusalem. Equally important, President Bush 
also stressed the importance of finding a solution for “the plight and future of 
Palestinian refugees”, in addition to the establishment of peace between Israel and its 
Arab neighbors (The White House, 2002c, para. 21). Notwithstanding the 
international endorsement of such a plan, the ‘Road Map’ bore no fruits.  
Following the Beirut Summit in 2002, a prominent Saudi-led Arab initiative, 
in accordance with UNSCR 242 and 338, was offered to Israel. Dubbed The Arab 
Peace Initiative, unanimously adopted by the Arab League, the plan stipulated a two-
state solution based on the pre-1967 borders. In exchange for that, the Arab states 
would recognize the existence of the state of Israel in addition to the establishment of 







with the latter encompassing both the West Bank and Gaza strip. Regarding the 
refugee question, the initiative insisted on the “Achievement of a just solution to the 
Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General 
Assembly Resolution 194” (Al-bab, 2002, OP 2-II). 
In line with the previous administrations, the Obama administration attempted 
to broker peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians in compliance with 
international consensus. As underscored by Tessler (2020), President Obama 
delivered a powerful speech in May 2011 advocating for the creation of an 
independent Palestinian state in accordance with the pre-1967 borders. In this regard, 
Tessler states that Secretary of State John Kerry invested heavily in the quest for a 
peace deal between the two parties. Whilst Secretary Kerry succeeded in reigniting 
peace talks that managed to bring the Israelis and Palestinians to one table for 
negotiation, his initiative failed in less than a year.  The Obama administration's 
stance towards the conflict strained relations with the Israeli government under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, however. This was evident in the 
US decline, in December 2016, to veto a UNSC Resolution that condemned Israeli 
continuous settlements on the lands it annexed since 1967. Indeed, it was a significant 
move from the United States in the UN Security Council that rejected the ongoing 
Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. In the same respect, in his final speech, 
Secretary of State John Kerry rebuked the Israeli settlements and indicated that they 
continued to constitute a hurdle in establishing meaningful peace between the Israelis 
and Palestinians (Sanger, 2016). 
To sum up, US peace initiatives and endeavors, prior to the Trump 







the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Issues such as the Israeli settlements in the West Bank, 
the status of East Jerusalem, as well as the Palestinian refugee question, were 
noticeably recognized by the US administrations from both sides of the aisle. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that historically, the protection of Israel has been 
considered a US national interest across the different administrations, be they, 
Republican or Democrat. This special relationship rests on three premises: security 
interests, shared values, and domestic support (Byman & Moller, 2016; Erdoğan & 
Habash, 2020). In fact, since 1972, the US has frequently activated its veto power in 
the UN Security Council to defend Israel from any form of condemnation or criticism. 
The Jewish Virtual Library (n.d.) tracks all the vetoes the US used to reject 
resolutions against Israel.  
2.3 Trump-era foreign policy in the Middle East: Existing literature and 
theoretical frameworks 
Quamar (2018) suggests that the Trump-era foreign policies have been 
“primarily focused on West Asia” (p. 272). Thus, it comes as no surprise that Trump’s 
legacy in the Middle East ignited a fierce debate in the scholarly field. Indeed, the 
literature on Trump’s legacy in the Middle East can be broken down into 3 main 
blocks. Whilst it produced a flood of criticism at several levels, a growing body of 
scholarship also shows that there were several positive aspects of Trump’s legacy in 
the region. A third block rather addresses the different theoretical lenses from which 
the Trump-era American foreign policy could be approached.  
2.3.1. A neutral and optimistic block  
Quamar (2018) argues that it took the Trump administration only a year and a 







policy in West Asia” (p. 272). For him, the departure in American foreign policy is 
manifested in three policies. Firstly, President Trump left US military bases in Syria, 
even though ISIS was defeated. He also militarily hit the Assad regime twice to 
punish its use of chemical weapons whereas Obama refrained from doing so. 
Secondly, he moved ahead with the moving of the US embassy to Jerusalem. Thirdly, 
President Trump reversed Obama’s rapprochement with Iran. 
Boys (2021) stresses that “it must be recognised that there were successes 
associated with the Trump presidency” (p. 29), among which was the Abraham 
Accords, despite the appointment of Jared Kushner, a state developer, which 
understandably raised the eyebrows of critics. Feith and Libby (2020, p. 38) argue that 
the Trump approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict succeeded in shattering the 
longstanding concern of the “Arab street”. The US used to take Arab public opinion 
into consideration for fear that its interests in the region would be in jeopardy. Yet 
with the Trump administration’s recognition of Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel as 
well as the “Peace to Prosperity” plan, Feith and Libby assert that “arguments about 
the "Arab street" will be evaluated with skepticism” as far as American foreign policy 
towards the conflict is concerned.  
In his assessment of Trump’s foreign policies, Blackwill (2019) writes a report 
in Council on Foreign Relations entitled Trump’s Foreign Policies Are Better Than 
They Seem. In the Middle East section, Blackwill focuses on American foreign 
policies towards Iran, Syria, and Israel, among other states. In relation to Iran, 
Blackwill justifies US withdrawal from the JCPOA and highlights its flaws yet notes 
President Trump suggested no alternative. Overall, he contends that, contrary to the 







consequences despite the absence of a clear alternative for the deal. With regard to 
Syria, Blackwill views that President Trump has pursued the right policies in Syria. In 
the beginning, he concurs with some pundits that the Trump administration’s policies 
in Syria were inconsistent, ambiguous, and confusing. He mentions how President 
Trump had surprisingly declared that the US would withdraw its troops in Syria 
before he stepped back after some members of his administrations, such as Secretary 
of Defense James Mattis, publicly contradicted him. However, Blackwill argues that 
President Trump was not wrong to pull out US troops from Syria since the primary 
US mission was to defeat the Islamic State, which was the case for Blackwill. 
Concerning US relations with Israel, Blackwill points out that President Trump was 
no different from his predecessors in terms of their support to Israel, although 
President Trump has invested more in the US ally, both militarily and diplomatically. 
He writes that the president’s decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem “was the 
right step to take and did not produce the harms that critics predicted” (p. 47), 
although his administration could have traded the decision with halting the Israeli 
settlements. On the annexation of the Golan Heights by Israel, Blackwill draws 
attention that Trump’s recognition of such a move would further exacerbate the 
situation in the Middle East. 
2.3.2. A critical and pessimistic literature 
In an article in the Foreign Policy magazine entitled “Trump’s Middle East 
Legacy Is Failure”, Cook (2020) acknowledges that President Trump achieved a 
certain level of success in the Middle East, yet argues he neither presented nor 
pursued a clear, harmonious, and comprehensive strategy. Cook writes: “the president 







Cook claims that “the only way to describe U.S. policy in the region is “strategic 
incoherence” (para. 2). Cook metaphorically depicts Trump’s view of American 
foreign policies in the Middle East, and more generally in the world, as driven by a 
Lazy Susan approach. One day, President Trump focuses on Syria. The next day is on 
NATO. The day after, his focus would be shifted to Venezuela or Iraq and so on.  
On Iran, Cook praises the US killing of General Qassim Soleimani yet affirms, 
what Blackwill (2019) already mentioned, that such a move fell short of a clear 
strategy on Iran, despite the “Maximum Pressure” campaign. Regarding President 
Trump’s “Peace to Prosperity”, Cook argues that it was unrealistic in its suggestions, 
thus it has not gone that far after the Palestinians categorically rejected it. He writes: 
“When it became clear that the Palestinians were not interested in such a one-sided 
deal, the president lost interest” (para. 6). This does not mean that Cook does not 
admit Trump’s success in the Abraham Accords as well as the more recent 
normalization of ties between Israel and Sudan, however. What Cook seems to miss 
in his evaluation of US strategy in the Middle East is that the Trump administration 
pursued a top-down approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the sense that it 
pushed for the normalization of ties between the Arab states and Israel at the expanse 
of the Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation. Allied to Cook’s analysis is the view of 
Zakaria (2020) who writes: “Trump does not have a foreign policy. He has a series of 
impulses — isolationism, unilateralism, bellicosity — some of them contradictory” 
(para. 6). By way of example, Zakaria states that the Trump administration’s policies 
on Syria were ambiguous, inconsistent, and conflicting. He mentions how President 
Trump had surprisingly declared that the US would withdraw its troops in Syria 







that the Trump-era “foreign policy is essentially a chaotic, confusing, and inept 
version of his predecessors’ approach” (pp. 16-17). 
Along similar lines, Wechsler (2019, p. 29) argues that the Trump-era foreign 
policy in the Middle East has been marked by inconsistency, unpredictability, and 
erraticism with regard to an array of issues in the Middle East. He maintains that 
certain leaders in the Middle East hoped to see a “return to normalcy” in the 
American foreign policy with the election of a new President in 2016, after a period of 
status quo revision under the Bush administration and uncertainty under the Obama 
administration. “Instead, President Trump has already proven to be even more 
inconsistent and unpredictable, and even more willing than either of his last two 
predecessors to depart from longstanding American policy norms”. 
Azizi et al. (2020) argue that the “Maximum Pressure” campaign failed to halt 
Iran’s destabilizing behavior in the region, even though it succeeded in crippling the 
Iranian economy. Iran embarked on a program to develop its capabilities in missiles 
and navies. Furthermore, it further invested in its anti-containment resistance 
premised on “asymmetric deterrence” (p. 159). This included strengthening its 
relations with its militant proxies and helping them develop their drone and missile 
capabilities such was the case with the Houthis and Hezbollah. Moreover, it proved it 
could retaliate against the US pressure such was the case when it shot down the 
Global Hawk drone in June 2019 by the Third of Khordad, a locally advanced air 
defense system. In short, for Azizi et al., the Trump administration’s “Maximum 
Pressure” campaign was counterproductive as threats facing the US interests in the 
region further intensified. It simply led to an Islamic Republic’s “maximum 







Katzman (2021) corroborates that the “Maximum Pressure” campaign did not 
manage to curb Iran’s alleged destabilizing activities across the region. It is true that 
Iran dwindled its fighters in Syria. Furthermore, according to Brian Hook’s testimony 
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2019, from 2017 to 2018, the Iranian 
regime reduced the defense budget by 28 percent and the IRGC one by 17 percent. 
Moreover, Hezbollah, facing serious economic problems, had to resort to donations, 
among other things, to fund its operations and pay its fighters. In addition to that, the 
Iranian regime itself witnessed sporadic waves of unrest in 2017, 2018, and 2019 in 
light of the deteriorating socio-economic conditions due to the economic sanctions. 
Yet in spite of these challenges, Iran did not succumb to the American pressure. Its 
regime proved to be quite resilient. Iran remains entrenched in the Syrian and Yemeni 
civil wars but also in Iraqi and Lebanese affairs. In this regard, Katzman suggests that 
the imposition of tough sanctions on Iran, even before the Trump administration’s 
economic campaign, had “minimal effect on Iran’s regional behavior” as it “has 
remained engaged in these regional conflicts” (p. 50). Equally important, the Trump 
administration’s approach did not preclude Iran from moving forward with its nuclear 
weapon program. Indeed, in February 2020, Secretary of State Antony Blinken 
declared that it would take Iran “a matter of weeks” (para. 2) to develop a nuclear 
bomb if it did not end its violation of the terms of the Iran Nuclear Accord (Obaid, 
2021), which is indicative of the limitations of the Trump administration’s policies 
towards Iran. 
In the same vein, the Trump administration’s “Maximum Pressure” campaign 
might be counterproductive in reaching another accord with Iran. Katzman (2021) 







parliament, who secured a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections held in 
February 2020, while at the same time weakening President Rouhani who is more 
open to negotiations with the US. Indeed, in late February 2021, Iran lawmakers 
called for the prosecution of President Rouhani following his alleged violation of a 
law passed in December 2020. This law obliges the Iranian government to halt the 
voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol under the JCPOA in an attempt 
to restrict IAEA inspection of nuclear-related sites (Motamedi, 2021). Even though 
the call for punishing the Iranian government was disputed by the Supreme National 
Security Council, it was illustrative of the critical stance that the Iranian parliament 
has in relation to future negotiations with the US. 
From a different perspective, Solhdoost (2018) argues that the Trump 
administration has reduced American foreign policy to a mere transactional business 
between the US and its allies and adversaries alike. He offers an explanation of 
Trump's foreign policies based on a transactional framework. For Solhdoost, this 
approach rendered US national interests and the President’s personal interests 
intertwined and overlapped, posing a real danger to US interests abroad. In addition to 
the outpouring of millions of dollars of campaign donations and investments for the 
Trumps and the Kushners’ business, Solhdoost points out how President Trump 
appointed his closest friends to senior positions, although they may lack the required 
diplomatic experience such as was the case with the US Ambassador to Israel, who 
served as Trump’s bankruptcy lawyer. It is in this context that Solhdoost asserts that 
Israel took advantage of the business interests that drive both the Trump and Kushner 







as was illustrated in the withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal and the relocation of 
the US embassy to Jerusalem after recognizing the latter the capital of Israel. 
2.3.3. Multiple theoretical lenses 
A third block in the literature concerns the scholarly work that attempts to 
understand American foreign policy from different lenses. The literature addressed 
Trump’s legacy in the Middle East from theoretical perspectives related to structural 
dynamics, populism, and Jacksonianism, among other angles.  
Yom (2020) claims that, in the Trump era, the Middle East witnessed a 
“decline” of the US “hegemonic” role (p. 75). He traces this back to the Obama 
administration which started to retreat from the region largely due to structural 
factors, mainly “the end of severe threats” (p. 81). Accordingly, the Trump 
administration “logically follow[ed] this downward arc of involvement” (p. 80) in the 
affairs of the region. Yom expects that the US will continue to withdraw from the 
Middle East and pursue a strategy of ‘Offshore Balancing’ in an attempt to rebalance 
the cost of maintaining order in the region. As a consequence, this will trigger a 
change in the geopolitical terrain as Russia and China will be allowed to play a bigger 
role in the arena. Similarly, Quamar (2018) maintains that “the common chord 
between Obama’s legacy and Trump’s policies in West Asia is that the USA is losing 
ground to emerging global powers” (p. 272), mainly Russia and China, although the 
US will continue to play the role of security guarantor, indicating a shift in the 
geopolitical arena in the Middle East. 
Hassan (2020) argues that the American foreign policy under the Trump 
administration was driven by an ‘America First’ policy paradigm. Hassan’s research 







linked it explicitly to the dire consequences of the 2008 financial crisis. His research 
meticulously scrutinizes the discursive-ideological formations of the ‘America First’ 
paradigm. He examines a corpus of 3,114,973 words emanating from the speeches of 
President Trump between 2015 and 2017. Hassan finds that “prescriptions of 
American decline were consistently articulate with an imperial right over the Middle 
East” (p. 134). This is evident in the President's recurrent assertion about ensuring the 
control of the oil in the region, by insisting on the US right to “take the oil”, which 
illustrates “a desire for an imperium par excellence” (p. 134). Cha (2016) also 
confirms that Trumpism was triggered by, among other factors, the worsening 
socioeconomic conditions that accompanied the global economic crisis of 2008 and 
how it crippled the working and middle classes in the US.  
Hassan suggests that the Trump administration attempted also to assert US 
imperial power over the Middle East through its endeavor to create an “Arab NATO”. 
Hassan goes on to state that the formation of such an alliance would “somehow 
institutionalize America hegemony by bringing the Gulf powers together to balance 
against Iran and Chinese interventions”, similar to the creation of the Central Treaty 
Organization, also known as the Baghdad Pact, which is very important given “the 
parameters of a limited US commitment” (p. 135). He claims that such an attempt is 
“Doomed to failure” (p. 135) and that the Trump administration will rely on “the 
authoritarian strongman model of imperial control” (p. 125) instead. In this respect, he 
cites two examples: the unconditional support for Saudi Arabia as illustrated in the 
impunity of the Al-Saud family regarding the assassination of Saudi dissident Jamal 
Khashoggi and President Trump calling President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi of Egypt 







From a different perspective, Clarke and Ricketts (2017) argue that the Trump 
administration follows the Jacksonian tradition of American foreign policy as 
distinguished by Walter Russell Mead. They state that President Trump taps on the 
principles of populism and the possible use of military power. By the same token, 
Ettinger (2020) corroborates that President Trump adopts the Jacksonian school of 
foreign relations by his embrace of a certain form of “populist sovereignty” (p. 411). 
The latter is associated with US leaders’ commitment to the service of the American 
public, the ‘folk community’. It is within this context that Jacksonians do not prefer 
international commitments that restrict US sovereignty and curb its freedom. Cha 
(2016) affirms that the Trump administration embodies Jacksonianism in that it holds 
deep-seated suspicion about multilateralism and international laws. He underscores 
that candidate Trump “suggested neo-isolationist and neo-sovereigntist 
countermeasures… against dominant multilateralism or globalism” (p. 89). 
2.4 Evolution of US strategies in the Middle East 
2.4.1 Offshore Balancing  
Mearsheimer and Walt (2016) and Walt (2018) contend that, during the Cold 
War, the US adopted an ‘offshore balancing’ strategy in the Persian Gulf, a strategy 
that they further theorized and presented as an alternative to ‘liberal hegemony’. They 
explain that offshore balancing revolves around the maintenance of the US regional 
hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and the insurance of balance of power in key 
regions: Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. This implies that the US would 
lead by example and rely on key regional allies to balance against any possible 
regional hegemon. If the balance of power is in peril, the US would intervene and 







regional allies—the Saudi kingdom and the Shah regime in Iran—to preserve its 
interests in the Middle East—a policy also known as ‘Twin Pillars’. When the Islamic 
revolution occurred in Iran in 1979 and gave rise to the Islamic revolutionary regime 
of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Rapid Deployment Force was quickly forged by the 
Carter administration to prevent the subversion of the balance of power in the region 
by Iran or the Soviet Union. Yet American grand strategy during the post-Cold War 
period has remarkably changed. ‘Offshore balancing’ as a strategy in the Persian Gulf 
came to an end after the US intervention in Kuwait in 1991.  
2.4.2 Liberal Hegemony  
The deep entanglement of the US in the region was carried out under the Bush 
administration with its strategy of “regional transformation” in Iraq and Afghanistan 
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2016, p. 3; Walt, 2018). In 
the same vein, Stapleton (2016) is right to point out that the Bush administration 
adopted democratic peace theory. Indeed, that was also clearly pursued in the first 
term through President Bush’s Freedom Agenda promoted in his National Security 
Strategy of 2002 (The White House, 2002a). In relation to unilateralism in American 
foreign policy, Schmidt and Williams (2008) stress that the neo-conservatives camp in 
the Bush administration advocated for the unilateral conduct of American foreign 
policy. They write: “The most striking example of the administration's willingness to 
proceed unilaterally, of course, was its decision to defy the will of much of the 
international community, including the UN Security Council, and invade Iraq” (p. 
198). 
For their part, Daalder and Lindsay (2003) argue that the Bush administration 







America’s goals abroad, but rather in how to achieve them” (p. 2). They write that 
President George W. Bush “relied on the unilateral exercise of American power rather 
than on international law and institutions to get his way” (p. 2), in addition to his 
keenness on regime change. In this respect, it should be mentioned that President 
Trump has frequently criticized the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq which, 
according to the president, cost the US trillions of dollars and thousands of deaths, in 
addition to the fact that it destabilized the Middle East. By way of example, candidate 
Trump said, in a speech on American foreign policy hosted by the National Interest in 
2016: 
It all began with the dangerous idea that we could make Western democracies 
out of countries that had no experience or interest in becoming a Western 
democracy. We tore up what institutions they had and then were surprised at 
what we unleashed. Civil war, religious fanaticism; thousands of American 
lives, and many trillions of dollars, were lost as a result. The vacuum was 
created that ISIS would fill. Iran, too, would rush in and fill the void, much to 
their unjust enrichment. Our foreign policy is a complete and total disaster. No 
vision, no purpose, no direction, no strategy (The National Interest, 2016).  
2.4.3 Retrenchment 
When it comes to retrenchment, the Obama strategy in the Middle East 
remains a matter of debate among scholars and academics. On the one hand, Yom 
(2020) underscores that the US undergoes a “Hegemonic Retreat” (p. 1) in the Middle 
East which he traces back to the Obama administration and attributes to the new 
structural dynamics in the region where a credible threat no longer exists. In other 







instead for a ‘Pivot to Asia’. Brands (2018) corroborates the retrenchment strategy as 
well as the ‘Asia Pivot’ pursued in the Obama era and remarks that this was necessary 
as it “provided the country with a strategic breather after a period of overexertion” (p. 
51) experienced under the Bush administration due to its overstretch in the Middle 
East.    
On the other hand, in the eyes of Mearsheimer and Walt (2016), the Obama 
administration was no exception from the militarism and interventionism that marked 
the American foreign policy in the Middle East. It made the same mistakes with its 
intervention in Libya and entanglement in the civil war in Syria insisting that 
President Bashar al-Assad “must go” (p. 3). Along similar lines, Stapleton (2016) 
argues that the Obama administration did not renounce military approaches in 
pursuing its interests in the Middle East, as was evidenced in the US-led coalition 
against ISIS or the US bombardment of the Qaddafi forces in 2011. The 
administration simply shifted its tactics, that is abandoning full-scale dispatching of 
ground forces in the Middle East. Stapleton maintains that the Obama approach was 
characterized by its “light footprint” (p. 2) when conducting military actions. This 
includes the reinforcement of the capacities of the indigenous forces, such as the Iraqi 
army or the moderate Syrian rebels, the deployment of certain Special Operations 
Forces, and the reliance on US strike capabilities like the high frequency of drone 
attacks. 
2.5 Regional transformations in the Middle East before the Trump 
administration 
In what follows, I present some of the literature in relation to the changes that 







important to better understand how the Trump administration capitalized on the 
situation to push for more transformations in the region which would lay the ground 
for the security alignment between the Arab regimes and Israel in their pursuit of the 
shared interest in containing Iran, which eventually, suits US disengagement from the 
Middle East. 
In an in-depth coverage entitled How The Israel-UAE Alliance Formalizes 
New Fault Lines in the Middle East, Odeh (2020) argues that the transformation that 
the Middle East is undergoing “was facilitated by the weakening of former giants in 
the region - Egypt, Iraq, and Syria - whose weakened states provided the opportunity 
for new rules and new alliances” (para. 6). Ferziger and Bahgat (2020) corroborate 
that “Since the early 2000s, the strategic landscape in the Middle East has profoundly 
changed” (p. 5). They attribute the decline of Egypt to the worsening economic 
conditions and the loss of its status as the leader of the Arab world. Regarding Iraq, 
they maintain that it was plagued by regional wars and the rise of ISIS. As for Syria, it 
was ravaged by the civil war that broke out in 2011. 
As corroborated by Dazi-Héni (2020), Ferziger and Bahgat (2020), and Totten 
(2016), there is much truth to Ryan’s (2015) claim that the Middle East witnessed a 
number of “regional shocks” (para. 19), or what Al Ketbi (2020) calls “tectonic 
shifts” (p. 392), such as the Arab uprisings and the US rapprochement with Iran under 
the Obama administration. There is an increasing perception in the Middle Eastern 
states that the US is growing more and more reluctant with regard to its traditional 
and orthodox role as the guarantor of security and stability in the Middle East 
(Ferziger & Bahgat, 2020; Ryan, 2015; Wechsler, 2019). Ferziger and Bahgat (2020) 







Doctrine. They take President George H.W. Bush’s intervention in Kuwait to liberate 
it from the Iraqi invasion as the best example to illustrate the US commitment to 
defend the GCC states. Yet things radically changed with President Bush’s invasion 
of Iraq in 2003. For Ferziger and Bahgat, this “shifted the United States away from its 
traditional role as the most powerful defender of the regional status quo to the primary 
challenger of the existing state of affairs” (p. 6) which ironically resulted in the 
empowerment of Iran. Wechsler also argues along similar lines. Equally important, as 
far as the dwindling trust in the US is concerned, President Obama’s rapprochement 
with Iran “set off alarm bells in the GCC states”. President Obama went so far as to 
push Saudi Arabia to come to terms with the need to “share the Persian Gulf region 
with Iran” (p. 6). Due to this volatility in American foreign policy, the US “is largely 
seen as an unreliable partner who may be in the beginning stages of a strategic 
withdrawal from the region” (p. 7), Ferziger and Bahgat underscore. Allied with this 
view is that of Wechsler (2019) who posits that the US role in the Middle East has 
become a mere “Question of Will” (p. 25). In his words: “The questions being posed 
today are less about American capability than about American will, leading to deep 
uncertainty as to whether the United States still defines its regional interests as it once 
did”. In brief, Wechsler stresses that “Many local leaders worried that this might mark 
a watershed in the path toward American strategic disengagement” (p. 29). 
Some of the Obama-era policies in the region caused doubt in the views of 
critics as well as allies. The abandonment of Egypt’s Mubarek by the Obama 
administration following the Arab uprisings in 2011 and the acceptance of the Muslim 
Brotherhood led some regimes in the Middle East to question the US support of its 







(Quamar, 2018; Quero & Dessì, 2019; Wechsler, 2019, p. 28). In brief, certain 
regimes were alarmed and concerned about the endorsement of democratization in the 
region by the Obama administration which would put their regime in peril, given their 
authoritarian nature. Moreover, Yarhi-Milo (2018) and Wechsler (2019, p. 28) argue 
that the US resolve was put into question by the inaction of the Obama administration 
against the Al Assad regime when it crossed Obama’s ‘red line’ of using chemical 
weapons against its people. Yarhi-Milo writes: “If Obama had not intended to follow 
through on his threat, he should not have issued it in the first place” (p. 3). Therefore, 
this could seriously cast doubt on the US willingness to firmly and assertively protect 
its allies in the region, as affirmed by Al-Ubaydli (2016) and Freedman (2017), from 
the threat of Iran. Furthermore, Freedman (2017) underscores that the rapprochement 
of the Obama administration with Iran that culminated in the Iran Nuclear Deal led 
some of the regimes in the Middle East to doubt the US willingness to contain Iran’s 
ambition to possess nuclear weapons and expand its influence in the region. He 
writes: “America’s Middle Eastern allies, especially Saudi Arabia and Israel, were 
particularly concerned that another American ‘red line’, preventing Iran from 
acquiring a nuclear weapon, would also be crossed without any US response” (p. 
244). Similarly, Al-Ubaydli (2016) raises an important question about the willingness 
of the Obama administration to attack Iran in case it closed the Strait of Hormuz after 
it stepped back from its military actions against the Assad regime following its resort 
to chemical weapons. He posits that the regional powers were doubtful about the “US' 
commitment to deploying the Fifth Fleet to protect the Strait of Hormuz” given “the 







When it comes to the formation of a coalition that counters Iran’s influence in 
the Middle East, Totten (2016) points out that there is a rapprochement between some 
Arab states and Israel in the making which could result in the formation of an Arab 
Sunni-Israeli alliance whose main objective is to confront Iran’s influence in the 
region. In his words: 
The effect of all this is something no one would have predicted a couple of 
decades ago and only the most astute predicted even a couple of years ago—
the Sunni Arab world, unofficially led by Saudi Arabia, is quietly forging a de 
facto alliance with Israel against Iran. (p. 29) 
In the same vein, following the meeting between Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal, 
former intelligence chief, and Israeli Major General Yaakov Amidror, former national 
security advisor, organized by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy on May 
6, 2016, the Lebanese daily newspaper Assafir described the meeting as evidence that 
Saudi Arabia has shifted its stance towards Israel and that it is now exploring the 
formation of an Arab-Israeli alliance that would secure the rule of the Al Saud family, 
as well as the stability of the GCC states, and fill the void of the US “withdrawal” (p. 
2) from the region (as cited by Abdelaziz, 2016). 
Similarly, Maher (2020) claims that the growing influence of Iran and its 
proxies, coupled with its nuclear ambitions, has reinforced Israel’s sense of security 
and pushed it to look for alternative forms of deterrence. Hence, a rapprochement 
with the Arab states has become part of Israel’s new “overall deterrence strategy” (p. 
17). Azodi (2020) posits that: “The emerging alliance has a strong potential to shift 
the regional balance of power in favor of Iran’s adversaries, namely Saudi Arabia and 







Chapter Three: Methodology 
3.1 Data collection 
Data for this empirical research comprised a corpus representative of different 
genres of documents about the Trump-era American foreign policy in the Middle 
East. The corpus was retrieved from the official documents published by the Trump 
administration during its mandate with respect to Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. This research thesis views the policies towards Iran’s influence in the Middle 
East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as two important parameters in deepening 
one’s understanding of the Trump-era American foreign policy and its geopolitical 
implications in the region. Through these two parameters, data sets were identified 
and interpreted.   
The data source was primary and consisted of electronic textual documents 
published by the Trump administration. The corpus contained policy documents such 
as the “Maximum Pressure” campaign or President Trump’s “Peace to Prosperity” 
plan. The latter was designed by a team led by President Trump’s son-in-law and 
former Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Jared Kushner. The team included Jason 
Greenblatt, former Special Representative for International Negotiations, Avi 
Berkowitz, former Assistant to the President and Special Representative for 
International Negotiations, and Brian Hook, former U.S. Special Representative for 
Iran and Senior Adviser to the US Secretary of State, to name a few. The corpus also 
included agreements such as the Abraham Accords Declaration and the treaties of 
peace between Israel and the Arab states with which it normalized ties. Equally 
important, it encompassed everything publicly published by the Trump White House 







and releases, fact sheets, proclamations, to joint remarks, press briefings, op-eds, etc. 
All these documents were carefully vetted as they were extracted from the official US 
administration website, hence they can be considered as authentic and reliable 
sources.  
Regarding sample framing, inclusionary criteria included American foreign 
policy documents in the Middle East under the Trump administration. Data in this 
research were approached in a systematic manner. Preliminary research was carried 
out and a total of 426 public documents derived from the White House website 
archives were collected. After an in-depth review, exclusionary criteria were applied. 
Only documents that were relevant to Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were 
identified as the sample. The ones related, for instance, to state and non-state actors in 
questions other than Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, were not directly relevant 
to this research and were therefore excluded from the data sample. By way of 
example, statements on the passing of Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said of Oman or the 
First Lady Melania Trump’s meeting with Queen Rania of Jordan were eliminated. 
This rendered the new sample size 390. The rationale behind applying such 
exclusionary criteria was the magnitude of documents related to the Middle East and 
the relevance of data to the research questions.  
The time frame of the sample was from January 2017 to January 2021. This 
period represented the Trump presidency and was of utmost importance and relevance 
to the research topic as it covered the policies pursued by the Trump administration in 
the region. President Trump’s pledges or promises as a presidential candidate 
exceeded the scope of this thesis; therefore, President Trump’s tenure constituted a 







3.2 Data analysis 
Qualitative content analysis of the data gathered for this research was 
conducted using an interpretive approach. Given that my corpus consisted of multiple 
sorts of data, analysis of the findings hoped to develop a deeper understanding and 
greater knowledge of the strategic shift that marked the American foreign policy in 
the Middle East and its implications on the regional geopolitical map.  
3.2.1 The classification scheme 
In this thesis, my corpus was coded using a qualitative analysis software called 
‘Quirkos’. Similar to ‘ATLAS.ti’ and ‘NVivo’, the software helped me to manually 
code the data in a practical and effective manner. Its lively and interactive interface 
represented the corpus findings in a visual way that helped detect the empirical 
evidence that addressed my research questions. I strived to make this research 
consistent and reliable by setting clear and well-defined coding and category rules. To 
start with, the basic units applied for text coding were the ‘sentence’ and ‘paragraph’. 
Codes in this corpus were developed following a deductive approach. In this regard, 
Frey (2018) writes that “the researcher may begin with a collection of initial codes 
derived from the keywords used in the literature search and the knowledge gained in 
conducting the literature review for the study (p. 5). Accordingly, I placed a set of 
initial codes that were extracted from my preliminary research of data collection and 
that were reflective of the research questions as well as the objectives of this thesis. 
These initial codes consisted of predetermined labels that were initially applied to a 
subsample, a pilot study, and subsequently to the entire corpus. Codes were initially 







● Regarding Iran: Iran and its proxies as the common threat, a catastrophic 
Iran Nuclear Deal, rebuilding mutual trust, rallying partners, multilateralism 
vs. unilateralism, etc. 
● Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: A rupture with the previous 
approaches, the need for a new realistic approach, multilateralism vs. 
unilateralism, bridging the gap between the Arab states and Israel, ending the 
chronic conflict, etc. 
● Regarding the geopolitical implications: regional transformation, countering 
Iran and its proxies, collective security and regional peace, economic 
prosperity, etc. 
At this juncture of the pilot study, codes were tested on a subsample of 
documents. Frey (2018) suggests that a “diverse subsample of documents (6–12)” 
from the whole corpus is sufficient for code testing. For this research, I selected a 
subsample of 40 documents. They were obtained based on 4 ‘critical incidents’; each 
incident followed by 9 consecutive documents. This implied that each parameter 
assigned 2 incidents. The ‘critical incidents’ were identified according to certain 
important events related to the Trump administration’s policies towards the Iranian 
and the Israeli-Palestinian questions. In developing the ‘Critical Incident Technique’ 
as a separate research methodology, Flanagan (1954) posits that critical incidents 
should have effects on the issue under examination and are determined based on the 
judgment of the observer. He writes: “To be critical, an incident must occur in a 
situation where the purpose or intent of the act seems fairly clear to the observer and 
where its consequences are sufficiently definite to leave little doubt concerning its 







identify the 4 critical incidents for the pilot study. The first criterion concerned the 
importance of a decision regarding the Trump-era foreign policies towards Iran and 
the Israeli-Palestinian questions. For instance, this could be an announcement, 
signature, or withdrawal from an agreement. The second criterion was about the 
effects or impact of a decision, be they negative or positive, on the respective 
parameter. For example, a decision could spur an array of domestic and international 
support or opposition and criticism. 
Regarding Iran, a ‘critical incident’ in the Trump-era foreign policies was the 
announcement of the Trump administration’s new strategy on Iran on October 13, 
2017. This strategy signaled a new approach advocated by the Trump administration 
to contain Iran’s influence in the region; therefore, it was worth the selection. 
Accordingly, 10 documents were extracted starting from the announcement of the 
strategy. Likewise, the withdrawal of the US from the Iran Nuclear Deal on May 8, 
2018, constituted another crucial decision by Trump's administration in its strategy 
towards Iran. Indeed, the unilateral withdrawal from the Iran deal represented a 
tipping point in addressing Iran’s nuclear program, and thus it was worth choosing it 
as a critical incident. Therefore, 10 documents were selected starting from the pull-out 
from the deal. 
With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, two critical incidents in the 
Trump administration’s strategy were identified to select the remaining 20 
subsamples. The first one was the announcement of the “Peace to Prosperity” plan on 
January 28, 2020. This represented a crucial event in that it laid out President Trump's 
vision on how to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and create stability in the Middle 







normalization of ties between Israel and UAE on August 12, 2020. The event was a 
breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli relations as it rejuvenated the normalization track 
with Israel, after 26 years since the signature of the last peace deal between Israel and 
Jordan. In light of these two critical incidents regarding the Trump administration’s 
policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 10 documents were selected for each 
critical incident.  
The initial findings of the pilot study revealed that the pre-set codes that were 
suggested following my preliminary research were strongly identifiable within the 
subsample corpus. Results showed that 7 of my the pre-determined codes were the 
highest and most dominant nodes in the corpus under study: ‘A catastrophic Iran 
Nuclear Deal’ (219), ‘Ending the chronic conflict’ (188), ‘Bridging the gap between 
the Arab states and Israel’ (151), ‘The need for a new realistic approach’ (126), 
‘Regional Transformation’ (121), ‘Iran and its proxies as the common threat’ (93), 
and ‘Countering Iran and its proxies’ (84). This suggested that the 40 subsamples, that 
were selected based on the 4 critical incidents, were to a great extent illustrative of the 
accuracy, validity, and reliability of my pre-set codes. The preliminary results seemed 
to support the thesis statement underpinning this study: the American foreign policy 
in the Middle East undertook a strategic shift under the Trump administration. This 
shift was premised on the US policies towards Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
By doing so, and as the US recalibrates its engagement in the region, the Trump 
administration triggered a geopolitical transformation through an GCC-Israeli security 
alignment to better curb the Iranian threat in the long run. 
After the codes had been properly tested on the sum of the subsamples 







documents. Based on the codes pinpointed, I set a group of categories/themes that 
guided me through the interpretation of the findings. They were as follows:  
(1) The adoption of a “Maximum Pressure” campaign towards Iran 
(2) The adoption of a top-down approach regarding the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, President Trump’s “Peace to Prosperity” plan 
(3) Triggering geopolitical transformation to confront Iran’s quest for regional 
hegemony 
3.2.2 Ryan’s ‘regime change’ theoretical framework 
In the interpretation phase, based on document-based proof and evidence, I 
examine the strategic shift in the Trump-era American foreign policy in the Iranian 
and Israeli-Palestinian questions. Then, I explore insights into the implications of this 
shift on the geopolitical landscape and security alignment in the region. In this 
context, I suggest Ryan’s (2009, 2015) ‘regime security’ approach as an insightful 
theoretical framework that could help analyze how the Trump administration affected 
a geopolitical transformation by moving the Arab states closer to Israel, hence 
ushering a new geopolitical setting that favors US disengagement from the region and 
that contains Iran’s growing influence.  
Ryan (2015) underscores that the regional system in the Middle East was 
subject to a plethora of “regional shocks” (para. 19) among which were: the Arab 
uprisings, the collapse of certain regimes, the ongoing civil wars in Syria, Yemen, and 
Libya, and the Iran Nuclear Deal. For Ryan, these “major jolts” (para. 1) destabilized 
the regional system and triggered regimes in the region to take actions both 
domestically and externally to maintain their security. Interestingly, these events 







argue, represented an opportunity for the Trump administration to tailor its foreign 
policies towards the Middle East. Accordingly, it altered the geopolitical landscape 
and made new alignment choices possible and appealing to both the Arab regimes and 
Israel. Ryan (2015) argues that regime security is the primary driver of alliance 
politics in the region, particularly at the level of inter-Arab relations. He lays great 
emphasis on the regime's domestic and external threats that lead its leaders to 
reconsider alliance choices in the Middle East. In other words, regime insecurity for 
the Arab rulers emanates from both their internal and external security dilemmas. The 
Arab regimes are always obsessed with their survival, thus their perception of threats 
invariably pushes them to shift policies both internally and externally.  
It is in this context that, in reference to his research in 1995, Ryan argues that 
“a regime security approach, rather than a Neorealist framework, better explained 
Arab foreign policies and alliance choices” (para. 6). Ryan (2009, 2015, p. 7) slightly 
refutes the macro- and system-level analyses of the Neorealist school in relation to 
alliance and alignment formation in the Middle East. According to him, the 
Neorealists do not provide sufficient empirical evidence that supports such theories 
when applied to the region’s alignments. For instance, drawing on Carlos Escude’s 
(1993) critique of Neorealism in ‘International Relations Theory: A Peripheral 
Perspective’, Ryan remarks that Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) balance of power theory 
draws heavily on Western-centric empirical grounds which are largely inapplicable to 
the Middle Eastern realm. This inapplicability is due to the specificities of the 
Western system of states. The latter is different from the Arab state system in terms of 
certain notions such as the balance of power, alliances, and national security. 







acknowledges that Stephen M. Walt (1987) contributes immensely to the literature of 
Neorealism and alliance formation by enlarging the empirical study to encompass the 
Middle East setting. Yet he points out that Walt largely underestimated the inter-Arab 
dynamics in terms of the importance of domestic politics, ideology, and political 
economy. He argues that Walt’s assumption of external security threat is too 
deterministic while, empirically, alignments in the Middle East tell a different story. 
In brief, Ryan maintains that the Neorealist views on alliance overlook the importance 
of domestic political constraints by narrowing the scope of what constitutes a threat; 
they eliminate non-military variables and stick to security threats as an external factor. 
Equally important, most inter-Arab alignments may not even fit into the nature of 
formal alliances as they might not entail “mutual defense pacts”. Therefore, Ryan 
concludes that the Neorealist theories such as the balance of power and balance of 
threat do not necessarily apply to inter-Arab politics. From another perspective, Ryan 
relatively agrees with Steven R. David’s (1991) theory of ‘Omnibalancing’. The latter 
is a reviewed version of balance of power theory and stresses the importance of 
internal and external security threats behind alignment politics in the Third World. 
Yet while he valorizes that ‘Omnibalancing’ takes into account domestic threats, 
Ryan argues that the theory essentially addresses asymmetrical alignments; that is 
alignments between Third World states and the superpowers.    
Drawing on his extensive empirical work on Jordan as a case study, Ryan 
(2009) finds that alignment choices in the Middle East were driven by three major 
variables. The first variable is ‘external security’; it includes external threats of all 
sorts. The second one is ‘domestic security’ which includes local opposition, social 







entails the need for economic partnerships and foreign aid, etc. These key 
determinants, according to Ryan, are the driving engine of alignment politics in the 
Arab world. He argues that they do not necessarily need to be all affected so that the 
regime resorts to alignment. The most critical factor could direct the alignment 
choices of the regime rulers. “Hence at times alignment decisions will be motivated 
primarily by traditional security concerns. At others, the most pressing need may be 
for economic support” (p. 14). Driven by these variables, regimes in the Arab world 
choose either domestic or external alignments to ensure their survival. 
Based on Ryan’s three variables, and given that many of the Arab regimes are 
“security-obsessive” (p. 11), I suggest that his ‘security regime’ approach offers an 
interesting theoretical framework on how the Trump administration affected a 
geopolitical transformation in the region. Ryan’s theory seems relevant given that the 
Arab-Israeli alignment was triggered by the Trump administration which brokered the 
normalization of ties between the four Arab states and Israel. In other words, the 
Trump administration tapped into Ryan’s variables to push the Arab regimes for a 
security alignment with Israel. In a nutshell, in my discussion of the geopolitical 
implications of the strategic shift of the Trump-era foreign policies, I attempt to test 
the applicability of Ryan’s ‘regime security’ theory on the Trump administration’s 










Chapter Four: Results 
This empirical research systematically analyzed a corpus of 390 documents 
revolving around the American foreign policy towards Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict under the Trump administration. In this chapter, I present in detail the final 
findings of my research and provide evidence that supports them. Only important and 
relevant findings related to my research questions are conveyed. Other results, such as 
President Trump’s “Economic Plan” for Palestine, US bilateral relations with Middle 
Eastern states, and fighting ISIS were also anticipated, yet they were not addressed 
due to their irrelevance to the questions under investigation. As previously explained, 
after coding the entire corpus, 3 major categories/themes emerged. Accordingly, I 
display the results in a graph as appeared in the content analysis software (Figure 1). 
Further, I synthesize the findings in a table for a better understanding of the 
categorization of data (Table 1). Then, I support the findings with details from the 







Figure 1: Final results of the corpus as shown in the content analysis software (Quirkos) 
 
Table 1: Synthesized findings of the corpus after the content analysis on Quirkos 
Category Code Synthesized finding 
 
The adoption of a 
“Maximum Pressure” 
campaign towards Iran 
 
 
Iran and its proxies as the common 
threat 
The Trump administration 
portrayed Iran and its clients 
as the common threat to the 
US, Arab states, and Israel. It 
unapologetically abandoned 
the previous US approaches 
towards Iran, especially the 
rapprochement of the Obama 
administration, and instead, 
pursued a confrontational 
strategy of “Maximum 
Pressure” to confront Iran’s 
alleged destabilizing activities 
in the Middle East. The new 
strategy espoused both 
multilateralism and 
unilateralism. 
A catastrophic Iran Nuclear Deal 
Explicitly criticizing the Obama 
administration  
Criticizing the previous 
administrations 
Countering Iran and its proxies 
A mixture of multilateralism and 
unilateralism 
The adoption of a top-
down approach 
A rupture with the previous 
approach 
The Trump administration 










“Peace to Prosperity” 
plan 
 
The need for a new realistic 
approach 
peace initiatives to resolve the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
and, instead, pursued a new 
realistic and pragmatic 
approach that was embodied in 
the “Peace to Prosperity” plan. 
The Trump administration’s 
vision followed a top-down 
“outside-in” approach to the 
conflict by focusing on 
bridging the gap between the 
Arab states and Israel since it 
suggested a plan that required 
unimaginable concessions 
from the Palestinians. 
President Trump’s “Peace 
plan” espoused both 
multilateralism and 
unilateralism that was often 
inconsistent with international 
consensus. 
Bridging the gap between the Arab 
states and Israel (A top-
down/“outside-in” approach) 
Triggering a change in perception: 
sharing common challenges and 
interests 
Economic and security 
motives/incentives behind the 
normalization of relations between 
the Arab states and Israel 
Ending the conflict 




confront Iran’s quest 
for regional hegemony 
 
Rebuilding trust  The American foreign policy 
under the Trump 
administration sought to 
engender a geopolitical 
transformation in the Middle 
East. To achieve its aim, it 
consistently worked on 
rebuilding trust with US allies, 
rallying up its partners, and 
creating a new geopolitical 
landscape. In other words, the 
Trump administration 
attempted to activate alliance 
politics by aligning the Arab 
states and Israel to balance 
against Iran and its proxies in 
the region.  
Rallying partners 
Creating a geopolitical shift 
 
In analyzing the corpus, findings revealed that data from the different types of 
documents affirmed and fell in line with each other. Results were neither inconsistent 
nor contradictory. On the contrary, they were consistent and indicative that the Trump 







Middle East. This shift aimed to engender a novel geopolitical setting, based on a 
GCC-Israeli security alignment, that balances against Iran's alleged aggression and 
that favors US disengagement from the region.  
4.1 The adoption of a “Maximum Pressure” campaign towards Iran  
4.1.1 Iran and its proxies as the common threat  
Repeatedly evident within the corpus is how the Trump administration 
perceived Iran as the greatest danger to US interests and allies. Throughout the 
corpus, the Trump administration endlessly portrayed the Iranian regime and its 
clients as the common threat, one that was behind all the mayhem that plagued the 
Middle East. For the Trump administration, the Iranian regime and its aligned groups 
represented the main source of instability in an already turbulent region. In his address 
to the Arab Islamic American Summit on May 21, 2017, President Trump depicted 
Iran as the common menace to the region. He said: 
But no discussion of stamping out this threat would be complete without 
mentioning the government that gives terrorists all three—safe harbor, 
financial backing, and the social standing needed for recruitment. It is a 
regime that is responsible for so much instability in the region. I am speaking 
of course of Iran. From Lebanon to Iraq to Yemen, Iran funds, arms, and trains 
terrorists, militias, and other extremist groups that spread destruction and 
chaos across the region. 
In the “Peace to Prosperity” plan revealed in January 2020, the Trump 
administration alerted the states in the Middle East to the geopolitical threat posed by 
Iran. The plan stated that: “Iran’s strategy seeks to encircle Israel, using Lebanon, 







and that “Iran hopes to establish a “land bridge” that stretches from the Iran-Iraq 
border to the Mediterranean Sea”. 
4.1.2 A catastrophic Iran Nuclear Deal  
Bashing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was a prominent theme in 
this research corpus. For the Trump administration, the Iran Nuclear Deal failed 
spectacularly to address other aspects of Iran’s destabilizing behavior in the region. It 
was marred by a plethora of flaws and regarded as none other than a colossal mistake. 
Throughout the corpus, the JCPOA drew a storm of criticism not only from the 
President and his cabinet but also from the US Representatives, Senators, foreign 
leaders from the Middle East, journalists, and think tanks. The JCPOA was 
interchangeably referred to as “Obama’s dangerous Iran Nuclear Deal”, a “one-sided 
deal that should have never, ever been made”, “nothing short of a foreign policy 
debacle”, etc. It took the Trump administration less than a month to publish a joint 
readout of the President's meeting with Israeli PM Netanyahu in which it stated that 
“the two leaders agreed that the Iran nuclear deal was a terrible deal for the United 
States, Israel, and the world”.  
Dissatisfied with the JCPOA, President Trump, on October 13th, 2017, 
announced a new strategy on Iran. It decided to decertify that Iran was abiding by the 
terms of the JCPOA. 8 May 2018 marked the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. 
Particularly noticeable in the corpus was the fact that not only the Trump 
administration and American decision-makers that commended the US withdrawal 
from it, the views of certain leaders in the Middle East also corroborated that the deal 
was not in the best interest of the US and the region. PM Netanyahu lauded the 







Arabia’s Ambassador to the United States Khalid bin Salman said that his country 
“fully support[ed] the measures” taken by President Trump. In the same vein, Anwar 
bin Mohammed Gargash, the Former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs affirmed 
that the JCPOA was “a flawed deal” and that the decision of the President was “the 
correct one”. 
4.1.3 Explicitly criticizing the Obama administration  
Throughout its mandate, the Trump administration poured harsh criticism on 
the Obama administration, by directly blaming it, for its alleged poor handling of 
Iran’s growing influence in the Middle East. Results showed that the Trump 
administration’s discontent with the Obama administration was not only for its 
rapprochement with Iran but also for its shaky and volatile policies towards the 
regime of Bashar Al Assad, Iraq, and ISIS. With regard to Iran, in a fact sheet issued 
on October 13th, 2017, the Trump administration criticized the shortsightedness of the 
Obama administration for not addressing the different threats that Iran poses to US 
interests and allies. It slammed the previous administration’s “myopic focus on Iran’s 
nuclear program to the exclusion of the regime’s many other malign activities” that 
destabilized the region. Regarding Syria, for instance, President Trump exposed the 
Obama administration’s lack of resolve to punish the Al Assad regime for its alleged 
use of chemical weapons against its people. When asked by a journalist, in April 
2017, in a joint conference with King Abdullah II of Jordan, whether his 
administration blamed the Obama administration for setting a red line to the Al Assad 
regime and not following through, President Trump confirmed the question and 







“Well, I think the Obama administration had a great opportunity to solve this 
crisis a long time ago when he said the red line in the sand. And when he 
didn’t cross that line after making the threat, I think that set us back a long 
ways, not only in Syria, but in many other parts of the world, because it was a 
blank threat. I think it was something that was not one of our better days as a 
country. So I do feel that, Julie. I feel it very strongly”.  
On October 30, 2020, a statement was published saying that: “On issue after 
issue, President Trump reversed the disastrous foreign policy of the Obama 
Administration and put the American people first”.  
4.1.4 Criticizing the previous administrations 
As far as the US entanglement in the Middle East is concerned, it was 
noticeable that President Trump unequivocally expressed his disapproval of his 
predecessors’ policies which, according to him, only further destabilized the region. 
On April 5, 2017, in a joint press conference with King Abdullah II of Jordan, 
President Trump commented on the US intervention in the region:  
And so, as you know, I would love to have never been in the Middle East. I 
would love to have never seen that whole big situation start. But once it 
started, we got out the wrong way, and ISIS formed in the vacuum, and lots of 
bad things happened.  
He also added:  
And I have to just say that the world is a mess. I inherited a mess. Whether it’s 
the Middle East, whether it’s North Korea, whether it’s so many other things, 
whether it’s in our country — horrible trade deals — I inherited a mess. We’re 







In the same respect, Newt Gingrich, in an op-ed, entitled ‘The President Just 
Made A Titanic Foreign Policy Shift’. The Media Missed It’, written for the 
Washington Post and shared by the Trump administration on May 25, 2017, 
confirmed that the President’s speech in the Arab Islamic American Summit on May 
21, 2017 “implicitly repudiated the approaches of his two immediate predecessors” in 
the region’s most pressing issues. 
4.1.5 Countering Iran and its proxies 
4.1.5.1 The need to counter Iran’s destabilizing behavior 
Throughout the corpus, it was abundantly clear that countering Iran’s activities 
and proxies in the region was a foreign policy priority for the Trump administration. 
According to a public statement published on January 22, 2017, President Trump’s 
first call with PM Netanyahu after taking office stressed that both “agreed to continue 
to closely consult on a range of regional issues, including addressing the threats posed 
by Iran”. Following President Trump’s meeting with Deputy Crown Prince and 
Minister of Defense of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman 
Abdulaziz Al Saud, on March 15, 2017, both stressed “the importance of confronting 
Iran’s destabilizing regional activities”. As an example of the need to confront Iran’s 
proxies, the Trump administration, in a public statement published on October 10, 
2017, entitled ‘It’s Time to Mobilize a Global Response to the Terrorist Group 
Lebanese Hizballah’, urged the US partners to work more on containing the group’s 
actions. 
4.1.5.2 President Trump’s New Strategy on Iran 
According to the Trump administration, the JCPOA was flawed because it did 







world. Therefore, “The Trump Administration’s Iran policy will address the totality of 
these threats from and malign activities by the Government of Iran”. President 
Trump's new strategy was inspired by the “peace through strength” previously 
pursued by President Reagan and rejected rapprochement with Iran as the President 
“understands the dangers of appeasement”. 
The new strategy, issued on October 13, 2017, enumerated different objectives 
to confront Iran’s behavior in the regions. First, it aimed at reviving regional alliances 
and traditional partnerships to swing the balance against Iran. Second, it aimed at 
denying the Iranian regime the financial wherewithal to fund terrorist activities and 
proxies, in particular through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The 
third objective was to protect against and confront the threats of ICBM missiles to the 
US and its allies in the region. Fourth, the strategy aimed at mobilizing the 
international community to condemn the Iranian regime’s infringement on human 
rights including the unjust imprisonment of the US and foreign citizens. Fifth, and the 
most important objective, the strategy aimed at preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear 
weapons. The “Peace to Prosperity” plan also pointed to the importance of 
collectively countering the Iranian threat in the Middle East. For instance, the plan 
urged the states in the region to “work together, along with the United States, to 
protect the freedom of navigation through international straits that were increasingly 
subject to the threat of Iran, its proxy forces, and terrorist groups”. 
In his second address to the UNGA on September 25, 2018, President Trump 
praised his administration’s “bold diplomacy” in mitigating the threats posed by the 
Iranian regimes, among many other threats worldwide. Yet it seemed that the US was 







“imminent”. That was the case with the killing of Major-General Qassem Soleimani, 
head of the elite Quds Force, and the Iraqi militia commander Abu Mahdi al-
Muhandis on January 3, 2020.  
4.1.5.3 Economic sanctions 
Throughout the corpus, the reimposition of sanctions on the Iranian regime 
along with its clients in the Middle East was a primary pillar that undergirded the 
Trump administration’s new campaign of “Maximum Pressure”. Notwithstanding the 
magnitude of sanctions that targeted the Iranian regime, results showed that US 
sanctions were unilaterally asserted on Iran without the support of the EU nor the UN. 
By November 5, 2018, all sanctions lifted under the JCPOA were fully reimposed by 
the US, following its withdrawal from the deal in May 2018. Sanctions targeted, 
among other sectors, banking, commerce, industry, energy, oil, and gas sectors in 
Iran. 
4.1.6 A mixture of multilateralism and unilateralism  
Data showed that the US, in addressing Iran’s alleged malign activity in the 
region, acted both multilaterally and unilaterally. What was noticeable is that the US 
preferred to contain Iran and its clients outside the auspices of the United Nations. 
Regarding multilateralism, the Trump administration, in its endeavor to overcome 
what was regarded as a “disastrous” JCPOA, called exclusively the European allies 
for the creation of a more holistic additional agreement that curbs Iran’s behavior. By 
the same token, in a press briefing on January 12, 2018, a senior administration 
official stated that: “I do want to stress also that this would not entail direct 
negotiations with the Iranians, this would be something the United States works out 







EU of the “Maximum Pressure” campaign which was eventually endorsed mostly by 
Middle Eastern allies with whom the Trump administration closely consulted on the 
Iranian containment throughout its tenure.  
As far as unilateralism was concerned, the Trump administration unilaterally 
recognized the Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, Syrian territories captured 
by Israel in the 1967 June War. In a proclamation of the decision issued on March 25, 
2019, President Trump maintained that the territories have been historically used by 
Iran and its clients in the region, such as Hizballah, to launch deadly assaults on 
Israel. Therefore, it was “appropriate” for the US to recognize the territories as part of 
Israeli sovereignty. In defending the US right to protect itself and pursue its interests, 
President Trump frequently promoted the embrace of sovereignty. For instance, in a 
fact sheet issued on September 24, 2019, the Trump administration put emphasis on 
the importance of respecting American sovereignty. It said: “President Donald J. 
Trump has shown that the path to prosperity and strength lies in lifting up our people 
and respecting our sovereignty”. While the Trump administration was willing to 
multilaterally forge an alternative Iran Nuclear Deal with the US partners, albeit 
outside the auspices of the UN, the situation was totally different with Syria. Findings 
showed that the Trump administration tried to reach a political solution to the Syrian 
conflict through the United Nations Security Council. For instance, it always 
emphasized the importance of the UNSCR 2254 and the United Nations-led Geneva 







4.2 The adoption of a top-down approach regarding the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, President Trump’s “Peace to Prosperity” plan 
4.2.1 A rupture with the previous approach 
Results demonstrated that the Trump administration was assertive in rejecting 
what was considered archaic strategies to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that proved to 
be unproductive and fruitless. In a statement issued on December 6, 2017, on the 
recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, President Trump indicated that his 
administration will abandon the unsuccessful policies of the past to avoid the historic 
deadlock in the Israel-Palestinian conflict. He stressed: “We cannot solve our 
problems by making the same failed assumptions and repeating the same failed 
strategies of the past”. In the official signing ceremony for the peace agreements 
between Israel and Arab states on September 15, 2020, President Trump reiterated 
that: “These agreements prove that the nations of the region are breaking free from the 
failed approaches of the past”. In short, the Trump administration was unequivocal in 
abandoning the previous stances towards the conflict.  
4.2.2 The need for a new realistic approach 
Results showed that after renouncing the previous approaches to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, the Trump administration advocated instead for the embrace of a 
novel “realistic “approach that can potentially solve the chronic conflict. This new 
approach was driven by pragmatic outcomes. In his address to the Arab Islamic 
American Summit on May 21, 2017, President Trump declared that his administration 
is “adopting a Principled Realism, rooted in common values and shared interests”. On 
September 20, 2017, in his address to the 72nd United Nations General Assembly, 







ideology”.  The “Peace to Prosperity” plan put emphasis on the importance of a 
realistic solution to the long-standing conflict driven by pragmatic principles. For 
Trump's “Vision”, “A realistic solution would give the Palestinians all the power to 
govern themselves but not the powers to threaten Israel”. On October 23, 2020, in his 
remarks about the announcement of the normalization of ties between Israel and 
Sudan, President Trump commented that: “We did it the opposite way — exactly the 
opposite way”. In a nutshell, the Trump administration pursued a remarkably different 
approach from its predecessors. 
4.2.3 Bridging the gap between the Arab states and Israel 
Pertinent to the adoption of a new realistic approach, was how the Trump 
administration consistently worked on bridging the gap between the Arab states and 
Israel. This endeavor was noticeably persistent throughout the Trump era indicating 
that the administration pursued a top-down “outside-in” approach to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. On February 15, 2017, less than a month after the administration 
started its mandate, and during a joint press conference with President Trump, PM 
Netanyahu stated that “we can seize an historic opportunity — because, for the first 
time in my lifetime, and for the first time in the life of my country, Arab countries in 
the region do not see Israel as an enemy, but, increasingly, as an ally”. President 
Trump confirmed what the PM Netanyahu said in that “it is something that is very 
different, hasn’t been discussed before. And it’s actually a much bigger deal, a much 
more important deal, in a sense. It would take in many, many countries and it would 
cover a very large territory”. In a Washington Post Op-Ed entitled “Could this be a 
game-changer for Middle East peace?” and shared by the Trump administration on 







envision an “outside-in” strategy for breaking the Palestinian-Israeli stalemate”. He 
added that: “The opportunities for trade, investment, and security cooperation 
between Israel and the Arabs have never been greater”. On January 22, 2018, in a 
joint press statement between VP Pence and PM Netanyahu, the latter remarked that 
Israel was ready to work with President Trump’s negotiation team “to advance peace 
with all our neighbors, including the Palestinians”. In short, this affirms that the 
Trump’s strategy to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict followed a top-down “outside-in” 
approach. 
4.2.4 Triggering a change in perception: sharing common challenges and 
interests 
Results suggested that bridging the gap between the Arab states and Israel was 
often articulated by reference to the depiction of Iran as the real threat to the region. 
Put differently, triggering a change in perception of who represented the greatest 
threat to stability in the Middle East was central to reconciling between the Arab 
states and Israel. This meant that Israel throughout the corpus was presented as a 
potential partner in confronting a plethora of common issues while Iran was depicted 
as the main source of those issues. 
In an op-ed shared by the Trump administration on September  4, 2018, Jason 
Dov Greenblatt highlighted the link between Iran’s aggression in the region and the 
need for a change in perception of what is the source of threat and who could be a 
partner in confronting it. He wrote: “Confronted with an emboldened, aggressive 
Iran...most leaders understand now that Israel is not the problem — indeed, the Jewish 
state could be part of their solution”. The “Peace to Prosperity” plan repeatedly 







“the State of Israel is not a threat to the region whatsoever. Economic conditions and 
Iran’s malign activities, however, posed an existential threat to many of the region’s 
states”. A rapprochement between the Arab states and Israel would yield fruits at a 
myriad of levels, particularly at the level of security and economy. The plan insisted 
that “Integrating Israel into the region will allow it to assist across a wide range of 
economic challenges as well as counter the threats of Iran”. It highlighted that “The 
State of Israel and the Arab countries have already discovered their common interests 
in combating terrorist groups and organizations and the common danger posed by an 
expansionist Iran” emphasizing that “These shared interest [sic] in the region should 
be expressed in closer ties between the State of Israel and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council”. 
In highlighting the opportunities to confront common challenges and pursue 
shared interests between the Arab states and Israel, the “Peace to Prosperity” plan 
devoted a separate section entitled “Opportunities For Regional Cooperation”. In it, it 
said: “In confronting common threats and in pursuing common interests, previously 
unimaginable opportunities and alliances are emerging”. By bridging the gap between 
the two parties, they can together pursue mutual interests and meet those threats. It 
added: “The threats posed by Iran’s radical regime, for example, have led to a new 
reality, where the State of Israel and its Arab neighbors now share increasingly similar 
perceptions of the threats to their security”. The plan maintained that these new shared 
interests and challenges required more cooperation and collaboration: “We have 
entered a new chapter in the Middle East’s history, in which courageous leaders 
understand that new and shared threats have created the need for greater regional 







important, the “Peace to Prosperity” plan devoted another separate section that 
pinpointed the Trump administration’s “Vision For Peace Between the State of Israel, 
the Palestinians, and the Region”. It encouraged the Arabs states to fully normalize 
ties with Israel: “This Vision aims to achieve the recognition by, and normalization 
with, those countries who do not currently recognize the State of Israel or have a 
relationship with the State of Israel”. In a nutshell, findings suggested that there was a 
correlation between the US policies towards Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; 
the “Maximum Pressure” strategy and the top-down “outside-in” approach 
crystallized in the “Peace to Prosperity” plan. Indeed, President Trump’s remarks 
about the announcement of the normalization of ties between Israel and Sudan on 
October 23, 2020, nicely encapsulated this correlation. He said: “Had we not done 
what we did with Iran, this could never [sic] worked”. 
4.2.5 Train of normalization 
On August 13, 2020, in his remarks on the announcement of Israel-UAE 
normalization of ties, President Trump pointed out that the Trump administration was 
already discussing further normalization of ties between Israel and other Arabs states. 
He said: “Now that the ice has been broken, I expect more Arab and Muslim countries 
will follow the United Arab Emirates’ lead”. On August 31, 2020, a joint statement 
stated that Israel carried out its first commercial flight to the UAE, flying over Saudi 
Arabia, which carried Israeli decision-makers and media outlets. In his remarks 
following the normalization of ties between Israel and Bahrain, Jared Kushner said: 
“It was the first time in 72 years that Saudi Arabia has now waived their airspace to 
allow commercial flights to fly from Israel back and forth”. In eulogizing the efforts 







prospects for further normalization of ties with Arab states are indeed attainable and 
within reach. He said: “Well, I want to say that we are extending the circle of peace so 
rapidly with your leadership, Mr. President, your able team.  History in the making. 
Actually, we’re all making history — from the Emirates to Bahrain; now with Sudan 
and other countries that are in line”.  
4.2.6 Motives/incentives behind the normalization of relations between the Arab 
states and Israel 
In examining the normalization of ties between the Arab states and Israel, the 
findings revealed that the motives and incentives were primarily twofold: economy 
and security.  
4.2.6.1 Economic motives/incentives to normalize ties between the Arab states 
and Israel 
Results showed that Israel was promoted and perceived as a potential 
economic partner in the region. The economic aspect was always identified when 
calling for the reconciliation of the Arab states with Israel. Some of the parties which 
participated in the “Peace to Prosperity” workshop held in June 2019 in Bahrain were 
all optimistic about the initiative. They considered the gathering of utmost importance 
not only for the Palestinians but also for the broader region. On May 19, 2019, 
Bahrain Minister of Finance and National Economy Shaikh Salman bin Khalifa Al 
Khalifa said: “The ‘Peace to Prosperity’ workshop underscores the close strategic 
partnership between the Kingdom of Bahrain and the United States as well as the 
strong and shared interest in creating thriving economic opportunities that benefit the 
region”. In his remarks at the same workshop, Jared Kushner highlighted the 







states and Israel. He said: “We can turn this region from a victim of past conflicts into 
a model for commerce and advancement throughout the world”. 
The “Peace to Prosperity” plan pointed out that economic conditions in the 
Middle East “pose an existential threat to many of the region’s states”. It encouraged 
the Arab states to forge economic ties with Israel to build stronger and more resilient 
economies. It said: “The goal of this Vision is to have the Arab states fully cooperate 
with the State of Israel for the benefit of all the countries in the region”. The plan 
stressed that establishing economic ties with Israel would be mutually beneficial 
“particularly given the interests of the Arab countries to move away from economies 
based on fossil fuels to economies based on new infrastructure and technology”. 
Equally important, cooperation included, among other things, direct flights between 
the states which would help “to promote cross-tourism, and to better enable Arabs to 
visit Muslim and Christian holy sites in Israel”. It also called for the integration of 
transportation infrastructure which will transform the region into “a global hub for the 
movement of goods and services from Asia to Africa and Europe”, in addition to the 
wide range of deals that could be developed in trade. The peace deals between UAE 
and Bahrain, and Israel signed on September 15, 2020, states that both states shall 
seek cooperation and bilateral agreements in investment, technology, innovation, 
trade, tourism, culture, energy, telecommunications, healthcare, environment, 
agriculture, water, among several other areas of utmost importance to strengthen the 
economy of these states. What was interesting was that the UAE-Israeli agreement 
highlighted the importance of the “diversification of bilateral trade opportunities” 







On October 23, 2020, the Republic of Sudan became the third Arab state that 
normalized relations with Israel under the auspices of the Trump administration. It 
was noticeable that the economic factor played an important role in such a peace deal 
making it a “pragmatic and unique deal” as described by a statement on the matter. 
Responding to a journalist's question, Secretary Pompeo said: “It made sense for the 
Sudanese people to build out their economy, to create democratic institutions — all 
the things that the Sudanese people have been demanding”. Equally important, on 
December 11, 2020, the US-brokered peace between Israel and Morocco which both 
agreed to normalize diplomatic ties. Same as Sudan, the peace deal between the two 
states shed light on the mutual economic advantages while pointing out the security of 
Israel. A fact sheet stated that: “This expansion of the Abraham Accords further 
enhances Israel’s security while creating opportunities for the two countries to deepen 
their economic ties and improve the lives of their people”. The deal will empower 
Morocco to strengthen its bonds with the Moroccan Jewish community in Israel, as 
well. On December 10, 2020, the US officially recognized Moroccan sovereignty over 
the disputed Western Sahara territory. In a nutshell, the economic aspect factor was of 
paramount importance and significance in the normalization of ties between the Arab 
states and Israel.  
4.2.6.2 Security motives to normalize ties between the Arab states and Israel 
Repeatedly noticeable in the corpus was the security motive between the Arab 
states and Israel. Indeed, the horizons of security cooperation were strongly present in 
the very first joint statement by the Trump administration on the normalization of 
relations between Israel and the UAE. The statement of the announcement on August 







bilateral agreements in myriad fields among which were technology and security. 
Further, the statement declared that the three states will jointly create a “Strategic 
Agenda for the Middle East” to bolster cooperation in diplomacy, trade, and security. 
It also pointed out that the three states were committed “to promoting stability 
through diplomatic engagement, increased economic integration, and closer security 
coordination”.  
In a second document published by the Trump administration on the day of the 
announcement of the breakthrough between Israel and UAE, the fact sheet started 
with a quote by President Trump which summed up the link between bridging the gap 
between the Arab states and Israel and the importance of collective security: “Our 
vision is one of peace, security, and prosperity—in this region, and in the world. Our 
goal is a coalition of nations who share the aim of stamping out extremism and 
providing our children a hopeful future that does honor to God”. The security field 
was mentioned twice in the same document. The importance of security cooperation 
with Israel was not exclusive to the UAE. The normalization of ties between Bahrain 
and Israel on September 11, 2020, also highlighted the importance of such an 
agreement on collective security. In a news clip, the Trump administration stated that 
the decision “further enhances their security while creating opportunities for them to 
deepen their economic ties”. In a fact sheet published on September 15, 2020, the 
Trump administration reiterated that by bridging the gap between the Arab states and 
Israel, “these agreements are leading to peace between Israel and the Middle East, as 
well as increased security in the region”.  
With relation to the establishment of diplomatic ties between Sudan and Israel 







the economic advantages, as demonstrated in the previous section, this agreement 
further served Israel’s security. The fact sheet stated that: “The expansion of the 
Abraham Accords to include Sudan is a significant step that will further enhance 
Israel’s security and create opportunities for Sudan and Israel to deepen their 
economic ties and improve the lives of their people”. Lastly, one of the clauses of the 
Abraham Accords Declaration stipulated that the signatory parties jointly embark on a 
vision of mutual security for a peaceful and prosperous future. It said: “We pursue a 
vision of peace, security, and prosperity in the Middle East and around the world”. 
Briefly, similar to the economic one, the security aspect was of utmost importance 
and significance in the normalization of ties between the Arab states and Israel. 
4.2.7 A mixture of multilateralism and unilateralism 
Similar to its approach to contain Iran, data showed that the US, in addressing 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, acted both multilaterally and unilaterally. What was 
noticeable was that the US preferred to suggest a solution to the conflict that was most 
of the time not in accordance with international consensus. 
4.2.7.1 Multilateralism through “shuttle diplomacy” 
Following a multilateral approach in which different parties were consulted, 
the Trump team conducted a “shuttle diplomacy” in the region in an attempt to reach 
a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In a joint press conference 
with President Trump on April 5, 2017, King Abdullah appreciated the engagement of 
President Trump’s team and valorized their endeavor to consult with all parties 
affected by a peace resolution. He said: “And so, his team had been in the region, 







June 2019 attested to the consultation with different parties in the region. Yet 
multilateralism was eventually overridden by heavy doses of unilateral decisions.  
4.2.7.2 Unilateralism: The US approached the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a 
manner consistent with its national interests and not necessarily in accordance 
with international norms 
The Trump administration stressed that it would do whatever it takes, even 
disregarding international norms, to defend US interests. In his address to the Arab 
Islamic American Summit on May 21, 2017, President Trump declared: “We will 
discard those strategies that have not worked—and will apply new approaches 
informed by experience and judgment”. He added: “We will make decisions based on 
real-world outcomes – not inflexible ideology”. In his remarks at the 2019 AIPAC 
Policy Conference on March 25, 2019, VP Pence commented on the Trump 
administration’s policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict saying: “Our 
President made these decisions in the best interest of the United States”. The “Peace 
to Prosperity” plan considered that approaching the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
through the UN bodies was ineffective and proved to be fruitless. It said:  “Since 
1946, there have been close to 700 United Nations General Assembly resolutions and 
over 100 United Nations Security Council resolutions in connection with this 
conflict”. For the Trump administration, “these resolutions have not brought about 
peace”. It points out how these resolutions were “sometimes inconsistent and 
sometimes time-bound”. It also recalled how some of them were even ambiguous and 
subject to “conflicting interpretations” from different states and legal scholars such as 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. In brief, the Trump administration 







The “Peace to Prosperity” plan unambiguously stated that the administration will not 
rely on the UN bodies nor previous resolutions to come up with a realistic and 
comprehensive plan for the chronic conflict. It maintained that:  
this Vision is not a recitation of General Assembly, Security Council and other 
international resolutions on this topic because such resolutions have not and 
will not resolve the conflict. For too long these resolutions have enabled 
political leaders to avoid addressing the complexities of this conflict rather 
than enabling a realistic path to peace. 
When it comes to criticizing the UN stances towards Israel, this was 
repeatedly identifiable within this corpus. In a fact sheet entitled ‘President Donald J. 
Trump Stands by America’s Cherished Ally Israel’ issued on March 25, 2019, the 
Trump administration lambasted the UN’s “unfair treatment of Israel” stating that 
“ For too long, Israel was the unfair target of biased and one-sided attacks at the 
UN”. It highlighted the President’s decision to pull out from the UN Human Rights 
Commission for showing “abhorrent anti-Israel bias”. Additionally, on different 
occasions, the Trump administration took pride in cutting funds to the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) as it was plagued by 
mismanagement and represented a hurdle in the peace process. In short, the Trump 
administration was not enthusiastic about working with the United Nations nor 
following international consensus. Instead, it criticized the UN agencies and 








4.2.7.2.1 On Jerusalem 
The Trump administration unilaterally recognized Jerusalem as the 
“undivided” capital of Israel. On December 6, 2017, in a presidential proclamation, 
the President reiterated that the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-45), 
urged the US to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and relocate the US 
embassy to the new capital. This came after the US Senate voted unanimously on 
June 5, 2017, to reaffirm the Act. To show support for President Trump’s decision to 
recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the Trump administration published a 
statement on December 7, 2017, which included the views of US senators and 
representatives, advocacy organizations, and Israeli officials such as the Prime 
Minister and the President. What was noticeable was that there was no view of any 
other foreign leader supporting the decision as was the case with other decisions such 
as the creation of a new strategy on Iran or the withdrawal from the JCPOA. The 
“Peace to Prosperity” plan came to insist that Jerusalem “should be internationally 
recognized as the capital of the State of Israel”. For the State of Palestine, its capital 
could be named “Al Quds” or any other name as determined by the State of Palestine 
and should be internationally recognized. 
4.2.7.2.2 On settlements 
The “Peace to Prosperity” plan justified Israeli sovereignty over the territories 
captured in the 1967 war as it viewed the latter as a defensive war. It stated that 
“Withdrawing from territory captured in a defensive war is a historical rarity”. In his 
remarks with PM Netanyahu on January 28, 2020, President Trump emphasized that: 
“No Palestinians or Israelis will be uprooted from their homes”. PM Netanyahu 







where our patriarchs prayed, our prophets preached, and our kings ruled, has been 
outrageously branded as illegally occupied territory.  Well, today, Mr. President, you 
are puncturing this big lie”. However, for the Trump administration, as underscored in 
the plan, Israel had to stop expanding existing settlements or build new ones. This was 
part of the compromises that Israel had to make to enhance peace prospects with the 
Palestinians. In relation to occupation, the corpus revealed that the Trump 
administration throughout its mandate did not refer to or consider the Israeli 
settlements as occupied Palestinian territories. In fact, even in the “Peace to 
Prosperity” plan, occupation, as a term, is used by the Trump administration to signify 
solely jobs and training.  
4.2.7.2.3 On Refugees 
The “Peace to Prosperity” plan pointed out that the chronic conflict between 
the Arabs and the Israelis caused a refugee problem for both the Palestinians and the 
Jews. It stated that “Nearly the same number of Jews and Arabs were displaced by the 
Arab/Israeli conflict”. The plan reminded the Arab states of their “moral 
responsibility” to integrate the Palestinians, the same way Israel integrated the Jewish 
refugees. As for their return to Israel, the plan unambiguously stated that “There shall 
be no right of return by, or absorption of, any Palestinian refugee into the State of 
Israel”.  In a nutshell, the decisions and characteristics of the Trump 
administration’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict made it indeed unique and 







4.2.7.2.4 Limited Sovereignty of the Palestinian State and the maintenance of the 
security of Israel   
Results showed that the statehood of the State of Palestine was often 
envisioned in reference to the security of Israel. President Trump’s ‘peace plan’ 
places restrictions on the sovereignty of the State of Palestine that were, in the eyes of 
the Trump administration, so important to maintain the security of Israel if a genuine 
and lasting peace was desired by all parties. While the plan recognized that the 
Palestinians “have a legitimate desire to rule themselves and chart their own destiny”, 
it focused on the concept of self-determination at the expense of sovereignty. It 
maintained that “Any workable peace agreement must address the Palestinians’ 
legitimate desire for self-determination” with no reference to Palestinian sovereignty 
in case of a statehood. According to the plan, “Self-determination is the hallmark of a 
nation. This Vision is intended to maximize self-determination while taking all 
relevant factors into account.  Sovereignty is an amorphous concept that has evolved 
over time”. The plan viewed sovereignty, as a concept, as not “static” and has no 
definite and definitive definition. It was within this context that “A realistic solution 
would give the Palestinians all the power to govern themselves but not the powers to 
threaten Israel”. In short, for the Trump administration, a practical and lasting solution 
to the Israeli security concerns “necessarily entails the limitations of certain sovereign 
powers in the Palestinian areas”. 
Regarding the new Palestinian state, the plan addressed the legitimate 
aspirations of the Palestinian people through, among others things: the establishment 
of the State of Palestine, assisting with building new infrastructure, strengthening 







security of Israel for it was “a country that since its establishment has faced, and 
continues to face, enemies that call for its annihilation”. The plan expressed the 
administration’s concern about the bellicosity of Hamas, noting that “a similar regime 
controlling the West Bank would pose an existential threat to the State of Israel”.  
If the Israelis and the Palestinians signed a peace agreement, Israel will be the 
main responsible for the security of Palestine. This entailed that the Palestinians 
would have to assume their responsibility in terms of their internal security. 
Accordingly, Israel hoped to minimize its involvement inasmuch as Palestine took 
matters into its own hands. Among the Israeli rights to maintain security and order 
was the use of aerial technology such as drones. This will help to mitigate the Israeli 
footprint in the Palestinian territories. Moreover, Israel retained its right to deny the 
entry of weapons or any related materials that it deems dangerous to its security to 
Palestine. Furthermore, Palestine was not allowed to enter any international 
organization if Israel deems critical to its national security, be it; militarily, politically, 
or judicially. In all cases, Palestine should obtain the consent of Israel before joining 
any organization. In addition to that, Palestine was not allowed to make any 
agreement, be it at the level of security, military, or intelligence, with any other 
organization or state that put Israel’s security in peril. Similarly, it should be denied 
the development of any military capability locally or externally that could endanger 
Israel. Equally importantly, in case of any breach of these security premises, Israel 
had the right to “engage in necessary security measures” to ward off any threat to its 
national security. Last but not least, for security reasons, Israel exercised full control 
and sovereignty on the Jordan Valley and the territorial waters. In a nutshell, the 







new Palestinian state which, unsurprisingly, did not meet the demands of the 
Palestinians.  
4.3. Triggering geopolitical transformation to confront Iran’s quest for regional 
hegemony 
Results suggested that the Trump administration worked towards triggering a 
geopolitical transformation in the Middle East. For the administration, new emerging 
threats required a shift in US strategies and regional dynamics. In this section, I 
demonstrate how the Trump-era foreign policies in the region aimed at forging a new 
geopolitical architecture by rebuilding trust with allies, rallying partners, and 
eventually changing alignment patterns to confront the growing influence of Iran. 
4.3.1 Rebuilding mutual trust 
Data showed that the Trump administration vocally expressed its intentions to 
rebuild mutual trust between the US and its partners and allies in the Middle East, 
after what was viewed as a period of skepticism and uncertainty. On May 22, 2017, 
the administration issued a statement reflecting the reaction of President Reuven 
Rivlin of Israel upon President Trump’s arrival in Israel. President Rivlin said: “we 
are happy to see, America is back in the area, America is back again.” On September 
20, 2017, about his address to the 72nd United Nations General Assembly, a fact 
sheet was issued stating that “The President is repairing relationships with Israel, 
Saudi Arabia, and other key Middle Eastern allies and partners. In his remarks on 
May 8, 2018, on the JCPOA, President Trump said: “Today’s action sends a critical 
message: The United States no longer makes empty threats. When I make promises, I 







Bahrain on September 11, 2020, President Trump said: “I’ve restored trust with our 
regional partners”. 
4.3.2 Rallying partners  
Throughout the corpus, findings demonstrated that the Trump administration 
consistently rallied US partners to confront the Iranian threat to collective security and 
regional peace. Indeed, the administration aimed at aligning the Arab states and Israel 
and propelling them to form a security coalition to thwart the growing threat of Iran. 
In a joint press conference with PM Netanyahu on February 15, 2017, President 
Trump expressed his intentions to rally US partners and allies in the Middle East to 
confront Iran’s aggression in the region. He said: 
I think it’s — let me say this very openly: I think it’s long overdue, and I think 
that if we work together — and not just the United States and Israel, but so 
many others in the region who see eye to eye on the great magnitude and 
danger of the Iranian threat, then I think we can roll back Iran’s aggression 
and danger. And that’s something that is important for Israel, the Arab states, 
but I think it’s vitally important for America. 
President Trump pushed for a security alignment between the Arab states and 
Israel in that the Arabs states needed to realize that they cannot always rely on the US 
for their security. Instead, Israel might be a strategic solution and a reliable partner for 
them in the long run. The Trump administration’s appeal for the security alignment 
between the Arab allies and Israel also seemed to constitute a stepping stone for a 
long-term strategic alternative for the US disengagement from the Middle East. In his 
same address to the Arab Islamic American Summit, President Trump noted: “But the 







them. The nations of the Middle East will have to decide what kind of future they 
want for themselves, for their countries, and for their children”.  
On October 13, 2017, in outlining the new strategy on Iran, the Trump 
administration noted that “We will revitalize our traditional alliances and regional 
partnerships as bulwarks against Iranian subversion”. On May 8, 2018, in a fact sheet 
about the US withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal, the Trump administration 
reaffirmed that: “President Trump will work to assemble a broad coalition of nations 
to deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon and to counter the totality of the regime’s 
malign activities”. In a statement published on May 9, 2018, displaying the support 
for President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Iran Nuclear Deal, it stated what 
Secretary of State Pompeo said about the decision: 
As we exit the Iran deal, we will be working with our allies to find a real, 
comprehensive, and lasting solution to the Iranian threat. But our effort is 
broader than just the nuclear threat and we will be working together with 
partners to eliminate the threat of Iran’s ballistic missile program; to stop its 
terrorist activities worldwide; and to block its menacing activity across the 
Middle East and beyond 
In his remarks to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 
September 25, 2018, President Trump said: “For that reason, the United States is 
working with the Gulf Cooperation Council, Jordan, and Egypt to establish a regional 
strategic alliance so that Middle Eastern nations can advance prosperity, stability, and 
security across their home region”. In the remarks of President Trump on the 
announcement of normalization of relations between Israel and Bahrain on September 







— to reach out, to create new alliances”. In a joint statement by the US, Bahrain, and 
Israel on October 19, 2020, the three states agreed that they will “advance a Strategic 
Agenda for peace and prosperity in the Middle East” adding that they “are aligned in 
their views on the challenges, threats, and opportunities present in the region”. 
4.3.3 Creating a geopolitical shift  
Allied to the Trump administration’s efforts to rebuild trust and rally partners 
was its efforts to trigger a geopolitical shift in the Middle East. This shift was 
achieved by pushing for a security alignment and altering the power dynamics in the 
region. Findings suggested that by moving the Arab states closer to Israel, as 
illustrated in the Abraham Accords, cooperation in the field of security could be a 
turning point in altering the geopolitical arena where all parties have a deep interest in 
rolling back Iran’s destabilizing behavior. 
On October 13, 2017, the Trump administration issued a fact sheet hoping that 
the “Maximum Pressure” strategy on Iran will “restore a more stable balance of 
power in the region”. On January 22, 2018, in his remarks in the special session of the 
Knesset, VP Pence appreciated that the region is undergoing a “remarkable 
transformation” and stressed “the need to forge a new era of cooperation”. He also 
added that: “The winds of change can already be witnessed across the Middle East. 
Longstanding enemies are becoming partners. Old foes are finding new ground for 
cooperation”.  
In a separate section of the “Peace to Prosperity” plan entitled “New 
Opportunities for New Regional Security Initiatives”, the Trump administration 
pointed out the prospects of forming alliances to balance against the common threat of 







common interests, previously unimaginable opportunities and alliances are 
emerging”. It also recognized that “The threats posed by Iran’s radical regime, for 
example, have led to a new reality, where the State of Israel and its Arab neighbors 
now share increasingly similar perceptions of the threats to their security”. On 
September 15, 2020, a fact sheet was issued affirming that the US is “facilitating a 
regional transformation” in the Middle East and that “President Trump’s policies are 
leading to the most rapid geopolitical transformation of the Arab world in more than a 
generation”. 
This regional transformation that the Middle East was witnessing was aimed 
to benefit the interests of the US and its allies while curbing Iran and its proxies in the 
region. On October 23, 2020, in the President’s remarks about the announcement of 
the normalization of ties between Israel and Sudan, Brian Hook lauded the 
“transformative diplomacy that has been led by the President” adding that “the 
President has stood with Israel and countered Iran, and that has given space to our 
Arab partners to move closer to Israel”. He also boasted that “with three peace 
agreements, this is now the third defeat for Iran’s foreign policy, and it is another 
victory for America”. In the same respect, President Trump said: “And I want to say 
— one thing that I do see is an enthusiasm from most countries in the world, for most 
people in the world — across the political divide.  Yeah, Iran is unhappy.  Hezbollah 
is unhappy.  Hamas is unhappy”. 
The UAE-Abraham Accords Peace Agreement signed on September 15, 2020, 
included clauses that demonstrate mutual interests between the parties notably in the 
field of security cooperation, so important for the geopolitical shift that the Trump 







“Determined to ensure lasting peace, stability, security and prosperity for both their 
States”. Further, the agreement stipulated that both parties will allow each other’s 
cargoes and vessels to access each other’s different ports and that both “Parties shall 
conclude agreements and arrangements in maritime affairs, as may be required”. 
Additionally, security cooperation also included the energy field as “The Parties take 
note of the strategic importance of the energy sector and in particular of their need to 
promote… energy security”. Last but not least, the two parties “Reaffirm[ed] their 
shared commitment to normalize relations and promote stability through diplomatic 
engagement, increased economic cooperation and other close coordination”. 
Similarly, the normalization of ties between Bahrain and Israel on September 11, 
2020, also pointed out the importance of such an agreement on mutual security.  
It should be stressed that after starting to see their efforts bear the fruit, 
members of the Trump administration praised the consistency and vision of the 
American foreign policy in the Middle East. In the President’s remarks on the 
announcement of normalization of relations between Israel and the Kingdom of 
Bahrain on September 11, 2020, Kushner said that this success was “the culmination 
of a long period of time”. He added: “And all of the promises you made on that trip 
and all of the things that you foreshadowed have occurred. It’s been a strategy that 
you’ve stuck with”. Similarly, Brian Hook lauded the President’s strategy saying that:  
you talked about the journey to get here. And I remember I heard you pledge, 
when you were in Riyadh and when you were in Israel — you pledged that 
you would strengthen America’s friendships and to build new partnerships in 








To conclude, my empirical data revealed that the Trump administration 
embarked on two shifts in its foreign policies towards Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. It followed a confrontational “Maximum Pressure” campaign to better 
contain Iran’s destabilizing behavior in the region. The pursuit of this strategy is 
considered as a much-needed approach after a period of rapprochement for which the 
Obama administration was harshly criticized. The administration also pursued a top-
down “outside-in” approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The “Peace to 
Prosperity” plan came to convey President Trump’s vision of a new Middle East. 
Interestingly, the entire approach focused on bridging the gap between the Arab states 
and Israel. This was evident by stressing the importance of economic and security 
cooperation between the Arab states and Israel while placing tough restrictions on the 
would-be State of Palestine. The Trump administration also worked towards creating 
a geopolitical transformation in the region. It rallied the US allies to form an alliance 















Chapter Five: Discussion 
Using an inferential interpretive approach, data discussion in this chapter sets 
out to understand the layers of meaning inherent in the research findings. First, I 
attempt to develop a better understanding of the strategic shift identified in the 
American foreign policy in the Middle East under the Trump administration. Second, 
I attempt to generate insights into its geopolitical implications, the most important of 
which is a burgeoning security alignment between the GCC states (UAE, Bahrain, and 
even Saudi Arabia secretly) and Israel, so strategic to help thwart Iran’s growing 
influence as the US recalibrates its engagement in the region. Research results were 
relevant to my research questions and suggested that the policies designed towards 
Iran and Israeli-Palestinian questions were correlated and both playing into the 
dynamics of geopolitical transformation. What made the Trump-era foreign policies 
strategic was the adoption of new approaches and the thoughtful pursuit of a 
transformative geopolitical vision of the region. While other scholars and analysts 
described the shift that marked the American foreign policy as “titanic” (para. 1) and 
“decisive” (Gingrich, 2017, para. 8), and “significant” (Quamar, 2018, p. 273), my 
findings suggested it was indeed strategic and had a transformative effect on regional 
geopolitics in line with the US increasing retreat from the region. Pushing for a 
security alignment between the GCC states and Israel may help the US, in the long 
run, to switch into an “Offshore Balancing” strategy as it can rely more effectively on 
key regional allies which by then would have developed an extensive experience of 
security cooperation. 
This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first one is about the 







campaign. The second one is about the adoption of a new top-down approach 
regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict crystallized in the “Peace to Prosperity” plan. 
The third section is a discussion of the resort to both unilateralism and multilateralism 
often in defiance of international consensus. The last section in the chapter is about 
the geopolitical transformation engendered by the two policies towards Iran and the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In it, I attempt to apply Ryan’s (2009, 2015) ‘regime 
security’ theory. 
5.1 The adoption of the “Maximum Pressure” campaign towards Iran 
The Trump administration unreservedly demonized Iran and its proxies in the 
Middle East. It assiduously sought to reinforce the idea that Iran and its aligned 
groups are the common arch-foe to the US and its allies. For the administration, Iran 
and its clients have a long history of viciously targeting the security of the US and its 
allies and, thus, are the ones to blame for the region’s plights. It is within this context 
that the Trump administration championed the idea that the overall destabilizing 
actions of Iran and its proxies, not just the nuclear portfolio, have been at the forefront 
of its Iran strategy. In this regard, it relentlessly criticized the Obama administration’s 
handling of issues ranging from the rapprochement with Iran to the use of chemical 
weapons by the Syrian regime. In fact, the administration did not show any restraint in 
indicting the previous administration’s rapprochement with Iran which allegedly gave 
it a blank cheque to carry on its threatening behavior in the region. This included 
Iran’s development of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and funding terrorist 
groups, among other malicious activities. It was as if the shortsightedness of the 
American foreign policy was complicit in Iran’s pursuit of its hegemonic aspirations 







Based on its absolute dissatisfaction with the JCPOA, the Trump 
administration, throughout its mandate, worked systematically to dismantle the US 
rapprochement with Iran. It unilaterally pulled out from the Iran deal and reinstated 
unilateral tough sanctions on the Iranian regime. Indeed, the Trump administration’s 
“Maximum Pressure” campaign illustrates how the Trump administration opted for a 
confrontational approach, quite different from the past US approaches, which used 
dialogue, negotiation, and cooperation with the EU and the rest of the international 
community. In particular, the Obama administration’s approach advocated fervently 
for diplomatic engagement with Iran, as shown in the ‘Historical background and 
literature review’ chapter. On Trump's approach, Quamar (2018) affirms that 
“Undoubtedly, it is a clear departure from the Obama’s policy of a non-
confrontationist approach” (p. 284). This shift, which I discuss in-depth in the fourth 
section of this chapter, is a vital part of Trump's vision to push for geopolitical 
transformation, hence Arab-Israeli security alignment. 
5.2 The adoption of a top-down approach regarding the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, President Trump’s “Peace to Prosperity” plan 
The Trump administration has shrewdly focused on bridging the gap between 
the Arab states and Israel. It heavily invested in a top-down “outside-in” approach, 
quite different from the US previous approaches. The restrictions imposed on the 
future Palestinian state prove that the administration was focusing on reconciling 
between the Arabs states and Israel, in lieu of pushing for direct negotiations between 
the Israelis and the Palestinians. This proves that the ‘Land-for-Peace’ formula was 
not that appealing for both the Trump administration and Israel since they could 







The severity of the restrictions on the sovereignty of the envisioned State of 
Palestine makes it unlikely that the Palestinians would seriously consider the plan 
given their vehement embrace of the spirit of the Arab Peace Initiative and the 
numerous UNSCRs. It is, therefore, no surprise that the Trump administration tailored 
such restrictions in the ‘peace plan’ on purpose perfectly knowing that the 
Palestinians will unapologetically reject it, thus exposing their inflexibility and 
intransigence in the peace process. By portraying the Palestinians’ unalterable stance, 
across the different factions and orientations, as a hinder towards lasting and 
comprehensive peace, the Trump administration paved the way for the Arab states to 
break away from the Palestinian’s sheer obstinacy and chart a new path for their 
regimes. It is worth remembering that, “Without doubt”, former President Jimmy 
Carter asserted, “the path to peace in the Middle East goes through Jerusalem” (as 
cited in Totten, 2016, p. 28). The Trump administration did exactly the opposite. It 
disregarded the need for a genuine breakthrough between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians and shifted instead its focus on the wider issues, on which the US has a 
certain amount of leverage, between some of the Arab states and Israel.  
The plan demeans any future peace prospect between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians, one that is genuine, realistic, and lasting. It killed the ‘Land-for-Peace’ 
principle that the Palestinians demand for serious negotiations, a principle that also 
underlies the Arab Peace Initiative. Odeh (2020) corroborates that the Israel-UAE 
rapprochement, encouraged by the Trump administration, leads to the marginalization 
of Palestinian rights. In her words, “The UAE-Israel deal ushers in an alliance that 
defies traditional common denominators and sidelines the Palestinian cause” (para. 7). 







Abraham Accords came to corroborate the top-down approach that characterized the 
Trump administration’s initiative to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ferziger 
and Bahgat (2020) point out that the plan failed to relaunch peace talks between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians as the latter immediately and categorically rejected it. 
Indeed, Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas described the plan as the 
“smack of the century”, asserting that the unjust plan strives to “liquidate the 
Palestinian issue” (Neuman & Kennedy, 2020, para. 10). 
Yet, looking appealing, the plan had active listeners among certain Arab states 
who welcomed it with open arms. Indeed, by the end of its tenure, the President’s 
approach started to bear fruit with refueling the train of normalization that kickstarted 
with Egypt in 1978. While the UAE claims that the peace deal with Israel would help 
halt Israeli settlements, thus narrowing the gap between the Israelis and Palestinians 
to sit on the table and relaunch the peace process, scores of analysts note that the 
Abraham Accords are not peace deals since none of the signatory Arab states have 
been in war with Israel. For instance, Guzansky and Marshall (2020) write: “There are 
no territorial disputes between them, nor any grievances or accounts to be settled 
between their political elites or peoples” (p. 383). The same applies to the Bahraini 
case. 
It is no secret that, prior to the normalization of relations, certain Arab states 
forged warm relations with Israel. According to Guzansky and Marshall (2020), 
Bahrain had already ended its boycott of Israel in 2005, and how the leaked 
documents of Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa in WikiLeaks had illustrated 
his official order to stop referring to Israel as the “Zionist entity” (p. 381). Erdoğan 







promotion of the “Deal of the Century” especially Bahrain which hosted the “Peace to 
Prosperity Workshop” in Manama in 2019. Ferziger and Bahgat (2020) affirm that the 
discretion of ties between the Gulf states and Israel began to ease before the 
normalization of ties. They recall how former Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman 
welcomed Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu in his palace in late 2018 and how Israel 
will partake in the World Expo hosted by the UAE in 2021 indicating that “the Jewish 
state’s presence is becoming more overt in places where it was previously kept quiet 
or outright barred” (p. 2). In the same context, in 1996, Oman and Qatar established 
trade offices for commercial relations with Israel, even though they were shut down in 
2000 in solidarity with the Palestinians following the Second Intifada. In short, 
reinvigorating the train of normalization with Israel seems to have shattered the Israeli 
taboo. While one might wonder that this was already the case with Egypt and Jordan 
in 1979 and 1994 respectively. Yet while Egypt and Jordan shared borders and a 
history of war and hostility with Israel, the UAE was not subject to these factors. 
Regarding the Saudi stance towards the rapprochement with Israel, it appeared 
more lenient even though it gave mixed signals. On the one hand, it most probably 
gave the green light for Bahrain and UAE to move ahead with the normalization of 
relations. On the other hand, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan, just a 
few days after the announcement of the deal between Israel and UAE, stressed the 
need to settle the Palestinian question first in accordance with the Arab Peace 
Initiative put forward in 2002 before normalizing ties (Guzansky & Marshall, 2020). 
Overall, one could deduce that the new leadership of Saudi Arabia, with the Crown 
Prince Mohammad Bin Salman, also known as MBS, as the de facto ruler, seems to 







2018, he was upfront in his stance towards Israel and declared that both the Israelis 
and Palestinians have “the right to have their own land” (Goldberg, 2018, para. 7). In 
the same visit to the US in April, during his meeting with certain Jewish groups, MBS 
commented that the Palestinians should “accept Trump proposals or shut up’ after 
slamming their rejectionist stances to previous peace initiatives (Al Jazeera, 2018, 
title).  
Other states unequivocally rejected the top-down approach such was the case 
with Kuwait. According to Al-Qabas, a Kuwaiti newspaper, Kuwaiti government 
sources assured that Kuwait’s firm stance on normalizing relations with Israel is 
“fixed and will not change” (as cited by The New Arab Staff, para. 2, 2020a). As far 
as Iran’s reaction is concerned, Iran’s IRGC condemned in the strongest terms the 
normalization of ties between UAE and Israel and warned that such a deal would lead 
to a “dangerous future” (para. 7) for the UAE. For its part, the government-allied and 
ultra-conservative newspaper Kayhan wrote what was considered as a threatening 
warning: “The UAE’s great betrayal of the Palestinian people…will turn this small, 
rich country, which is heavily dependent on security, into a legitimate and easy 
target” (as cited by Shepp, 2020, para. 7). 
5.3 American foreign policy with a heavy dose of unilateralism 
Throughout its mandate, the Trump administration was scathingly critical of 
the United Nations with its different agencies. On several occasions, it eschewed 
working with the UN in addressing some of the most pressing issues in the Middle 
East: Iran’s alleged malign activities and the longstanding Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
However, on other issues such as the Syrian civil war, the administration did not 







simply because the war in Syria did not represent a US foreign policy priority. In what 
follows, I discuss the Trump administration’s embrace of unilateralism that often 
contradicted international norms. 
5.3.1 On Iran 
Although the Trump administration took a unilateral decision in shredding the 
JCPOA, it undeniably consulted with its regional partners, among which were Israel, 
Saudi Arabia, and UAE. Accordingly, the administration seemingly changed the US 
multilateral mechanism in its containment of Iran in that it sidelined both the United 
Nations and the European allies, both constituted pillars in the last 2 decades in 
negotiating with Iran, as discussed in the Second Chapter. Yet following the US 
withdrawal from the JCPOA, the UN and EU, among others, voiced their regret on 
the unilateral decision. The UN Secretary-General presented a report, ‘(S/2018/602)’, 
on June 12, 2018, reiterating that resolution 2231, in favor of the JCPOA, was fully 
implemented and respected by Iran. The report confirmed that Iran “has been 
implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action” and considers the US withdrawal from the deal a “setback” to the whole 
process (UN Secretary-General, 2018, p. 1). Similarly, the EU expressed its deep 
regret of the US unilateral move highlighting that the JCPOA “is the culmination of 
12 years of diplomacy which has been working and delivering on its main goal” 
(Council of the European Union, 2018, para. 5). This clearly indicates that, in the 
Trump era, the United Nations was sidelined and the Europeans were replaced by the 
US closest allies in the region.  
As part of its sustained effort to thwart the JCPOA, the US suggested, in 







would extend the restrictions on Iran regarding arms set to expire in October 2020. 
The US failed, however, to pass the resolution with only the US and the Dominican 
Republic voting in favor, while China and Russia vetoing the draft, and the remaining 
Council members abstaining from voting. In the same month, the US tried to 
reimpose the pre-2015 UN sanctions by invoking its “snapback” (para. 6) right under 
the JCPOA but failed once again (Scheffer, 2020). Hence, even though the US actions 
were taken through the UN Security Council, there were yet again unilateral moves by 
the Trump administration which only resulted in more isolation of the US on the 
world stage. 
Further, in another effort to contain Iran and its proxies, the Trump 
administration unilaterally recognized the Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, 
a decision that spawned worldwide criticism. Members in the UN Security Council 
vocally expressed their regret over the decision with the EU members stating that 
“Annexation of territory by force is prohibited under international law,” reaffirming 
that unilateral annexation of other territories is in defiance of “the rules-based 
international order and the UN Charter” (as cited in Deutsche Welle, 2019, para. 6). It 
is worth remembering that, following the annexation of the Golan Heights by Israel, 
the Security Council adopted Resolution 497 on December 17, 1981, in which it 
highlighted that “the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible” (PP 2). Besides, 
it unequivocally recognized the captured territories as “occupied Syrian Golan 
Heights” and that Israeli’s control over the area “is null and void and without 
international legal effect” (OP 1). Equally important, the resolution stipulated that 
“Israel, the occupying Power, should rescind forthwith its decision” (United Nations, 







To conclude, the Trump administration’s espousal of unilateralism regarding 
Iran manifested itself in the withdrawal from the JCPOA, the reimposition of 
economic sanctions, the suggestion of security council resolutions, and recognition of 
Israel’s sovereignty on the Golan Heights. These moves were testimonial to the 
assertive and confrontational aspect of the Trump administration approach regarding 
Iran, yet they were at the same time self-isolating actions in the international arena. 
Indeed, using diplomatic means, the EU and the international community resorted to 
‘soft balancing’ against the US as a response to its unilateralism as expected by Pape 
(2005). Certainly, these moves marked a shift from the past approaches where the US 
worked closely with its international partners, especially the EU, to address Iran’s 
nuclear program and growing influence in the Middle East.  
5.3.2 On the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
After the repeated renunciation of the past approaches in handling the 
longstanding Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it became crystal clear then that the Trump 
administration would take a different path driven by a “realistic” and “pragmatic” 
regional approach. In dealing with the conflict, the Trump administration touted itself 
as a unique deal maker and peace broker. However, for the administration, in order to 
be successful, it should be unshackled by the failed approaches of the past, even 
though at the expense of international norms, which, according to the administration, 
used to hinder the peace process. Indifferent to these constraints, President Trump 
took a number of unilateral decisions regarding Jerusalem, Israeli settlements in the 
West Bank, the Palestinian refugee question, but also a wide range of other issues that 
drew a flurry of criticism leading many to question the US role as a neutral peace 







When the Trump administration overturned decades of American foreign 
policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by recognizing Jerusalem as the 
capital of Israel, it faced widespread criticism from the international community, 
including the closest allies of the US. The unilateral recognition of Jerusalem broke 
with a longstanding international consensus that the status of Jerusalem should remain 
unresolved until the Israelis and the Palestinians find a common ground to resolve it. 
Similarly, on December 21, 2017, the overwhelming majority in the UN General 
Assembly voted for resolution ‘GA/11995’ which rebuked the Jerusalem decision by 
the Trump administration. As a response to that, the US threatened the states who 
voted in favor of the resolution with punitive actions such as cutting foreign aids 
(Fassihi, 2017). With the US standing alone in defending its unilateral decision, it 
used its veto to reject a security council resolution on the matter. Yet the fact that all 
members in the council except the US voted to adopt the resolution drew the attention 
of scores of analysts who regarded the vote as a rebuke to the Trump administration’s 
unilateral decision. Gladstone (2017) writes: 
The rebukes, made at an emergency Security Council meeting called over Mr. 
Trump’s announcement, constituted an extraordinarily public denunciation of 
American policy on the world’s most prominent diplomatic stage, leaving the 
United States alone on the issue among the council’s 15 members. (para. 2) 
Regarding the question of settlements, the “Peace to Prosperity” plan does not 
view Israeli settlements as illegal. On the contrary, it recognizes and endorses Israeli 
sovereignty over large swathes of areas in the West Bank. It runs counter to the 
international consensus on the Israel-Palestinian conflict. In addition to the Arab 







settlements. In a statement, the EU reaffirmed its “clear” and “unchanged” stance that 
“all settlement activity is illegal under international law and it erodes the viability of 
the two-state solution and the prospects for a lasting peace” (para. 1). The EU also 
urged Israel “to end all settlement activity”, referring to it as the “occupying power” 
(Mogherini, 2019, para. 2). In the same vein, UNSCRs which condemn the Israeli 
settlements are numerous. By way of example, Resolution 446 adopted on March 22, 
1979 “Determines that the policy and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in 
the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity” 
(OP1) and demands Israel, referring to it as “the occupying Power”, “to abide 
scrupulously by the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention” (United Nations Security 
Council, 1979, OP3).  
As far as the refugee question is concerned, it was thrown under the bus as the 
administration advocated for a no-return solution. In the same respect, it cut US 
funding for the UNRWA. These constituted decisive policies never advocated before 
by the previous US administrations. Unilateralism was also manifested in other issues. 
The Trump administration took a set of additional decisions in an attempt to increase 
the pressure on the Palestinian Authority to come to the negotiating table with Israel. 
It closed the Palestine Liberation Organization office in Washington, and ended US 
aid to Palestinians, in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. To sum up, the 
adoption of unilateralism testifies to the abandonment of not only US past stances, but 
also international consensus regarding some of the most complicated issues in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As a result, the Trump decisions could hinder genuine 







5.3.3 The rationale behind the Trump administration disregard of international 
institutions and norms  
The administration perceived international institutions as not conducive 
neither to the American interests nor to any realistic solution to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Equally disturbing for the Trump administration, the UN bodies discriminate 
against Israel, its closest ally in the region. Therefore, it took the international 
constraints out of its equation and let its foreign policy be driven purely by its own 
national security considerations. The Trump administration’s neglect to address global 
issues through international institutions emanates from its espousal of what the 
administration termed “principled realism” and its promotion of the notion of 
“sovereignty”. Powaski (2019, p. 247) argues that the 2017 National Security Strategy 
stresses the pursuit of the US national interests and that the best way to protect them is 
not through the conventional international institutions, but rather through inter-state 
sovereign relations. For Powaski, the strategy “acknowledges the centrality of power 
in international politics”, ergo the emphasis of the Trump administration on the 
importance of the Realist school in international relations.  
Ettinger (2020) expounds on the administration's emphasis on the need to 
respect US sovereignty. The Trump administration incarnates “populist sovereignty” 
(p. 411) in the sense that it is the moral duty and responsibility of the administration 
to protect the American nation and preserve its interests, regardless of the 
international constraints. In this respect, stressing the need to fully embrace 
sovereignty falls in line with the underpinnings of the Jacksonian school of American 
foreign policy which does not show any restraint in slashing international 







President Trump’s speeches, in addition to the 2017 National Security Strategy, are 
illustrative of the “fidelity to popular sovereignty and the conservative case for 
rejecting international law and governance” (p. 423). This is also affirmed by Cha 
(2016). In the same vein, Ashbee and Hurst (2019) corroborate that the National 
Security Strategy, which holds international cooperation in suspicion, stressed the 
idea of competition between nations with the term “competition” (p. 10) employed 
eighteen times. Yet Ettinger notes that the US rejection of international institutions is 
not something new. He recalls how the US Congress, in the 20th century, firmly 
rejected the US participation in the League of Nations and that such a decision was 
“driven by concerns over international restrictions on American freedom of action” 
(p. 423). In a nutshell, the Trump administration defended its sovereign right to act in 
the best interest of the US even if it was at the expense of US international 
commitment and norms. 
5.4 Triggering geopolitical transformation: An Arab-Israeli security alignment 
to confront Iran’s quest for regional hegemony 
As the US continues to disengage from the region, the Trump administration 
embarked on a strategic shift in the American foreign policies towards Iran and the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict to catalyze a geopolitical transformation in the region. This 
resulted in laying the ground for an Arab-Israel security alignment to better balance 
against Iran’s growing influence. The chapter is divided into two main sections. In the 
first section, I apply the strategic shift of Trump-era American foreign policy on 
Ryan’s three variables behind the Arab-Israeli alignment. In the second section, I 







features of this potential Arab-Israeli security alignment. Secondly, I showcase how 
the geopolitical struggle could raise tensions in the Persian Gulf.  
5.4.1 Application of Ryan’s three variables on the Trump administration’s 
approach to the Arab-Israeli alignment. 
According to Ryan’s ‘regime security’ theory (2009, 2015), there are three 
variables that could put the security of the Arab regimes at risk: ‘domestic security’, 
‘political economy’, and ‘external security’. To ensure their security, Arab regimes 
tend to shift their external alignments. In attempting to apply Ryan’s theory to the 
study, I found ‘external security’ as the most pressing variable that the Trump 
administration played into to push for the Arab-Israeli alignment. This was followed 
by the ‘political economy’ variable, with no reference to the ‘domestic security’ 
variable at all. I suggest Ryan’s framework as informative theoretical lenses through 
which the Trump administration’s approach towards the American foreign policy in 
the Middle East could be explored. 
5.4.1.1 The ‘domestic security’ variable 
This factor was not identified in the data findings. Results did not reveal that 
the Trump administration nor the Arab leaders addressed domestic threats to their 
regimes. However, the Arab-Israeli alignment helps the Arab rulers to maximize their 
internal security. In other words, domestic security could benefit from the alignment 
decision with Israel and did not cause it, according to my corpus findings. Ryan 
maintains that Arab alignment choices have “domestic consequences, often bolstering 
existing authoritarian systems and thwarting hope for greater domestic change (2015, 







could benefit from alignment with Israel to strengthen their security apparatus. Given 
that technological cooperation is stipulated in the Abraham Accords, the Gulf regimes 
could take their existing cooperation with Israel in this field to a higher and more 
sophisticated level. In this respect, not only counter-terrorism efforts could flourish, 
but also repressing critics and opponents could also intensify. There is already a litany 
of reports that state that Israel has provided GCC states with highly sophisticated 
surveillance technology that they use to spy and crack down on political dissidents 
(Bergman, 2016; Mazzetti et al., 2019; Zilber, 2019). Regarding the UAE, it could 
make most of the Israeli expertise in the field of technology so that it tightens its grip 
on the opposition voices, especially the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated activists, that 
were emboldened by the Arab Spring under the watch of the Obama administration. 
The same applies to Bahrain. It could benefit tremendously from the technological 
prowess of Israel to purchase surveillance software and devices to stifle the Shia 
opposition groups that led the 2011 uprising and continue to represent a domestic 
threat to the Al Khalifa regime. In short, by aligning with Israel, Arab regimes could 
benefit from the Israeli technological know-how to fend off internal security threats, 
even though the ‘domestic security’ factor was neither raised by the Arab leaders nor 
explored by the Trump administration according to my corpus results. 
5.4.1.2 The ‘political economy’ variable 
For many Arab regimes, Israel represents a potential economic partner to 
diversify and boost their economies. For its part, the Trump administration capitalized 
on the ‘political economy’ factor. The most illustrative case was Sudan. It is mired in 







suffers from social unrest. Thus, the US decision to remove Sudan from the State 
Sponsors of Terrorism list represented an incentive to align with Israel. This helped 
Sudan lift the US sanctions and put an end to three decades of international isolation. 
Indeed, in announcing the normalization of relations between Sudan and Israel on 
October 23, 2020, President Trump remarked that Sudan’s peace agreement with 
Israel will “end Sudan’s long isolation from the world”. Moreover, both the United 
States and Israel will help Sudan unlock its economic potential by helping it “restore 
Sudan’s sovereign immunity and to engage its international partners to reduce 
Sudan’s debt burdens”, a joint statement released on October 23, 2020, affirmed. 
Furthermore, Israel launched economic and trade relations with Sudan with a 
particular focus on agriculture, so important for food security in Sudan. In a nutshell, 
the ‘political economy’ determinant, including foreign aids, investment, and the need 
for social stability, seems to be instrumental in pushing Sudan to align with Israel, a 
factor the Trump administration capitalized on to approach the Israeli-Sudanese 
alignment.  
As for the GCC regimes, economic diversification is vital to overcome the 
existing economic challenges as recommended by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). On the prospects of the oil sector in the Middle East, the latter released a study 
in early 2020 entitled The Future of Oil and Fiscal Sustainability in the GCC Region. 
In it, Mirzoev et al. (2020) alert the Gulf Cooperation Council to the probability that 
“global oil demand could peak as early as 2030” (p. 12) due to the increasing use of 
renewable energy and the growing danger of climate change, among several other 
factors. Thus, they recommend that the six GCC member states embark on and 







economic crisis. Mirzoev et al. warn that “the region’s aggregate net financial wealth, 
estimated at $2 trillion at present, would turn negative by 2034 as the region becomes 
a net borrower” (p. 21). Given that an oil crisis is in the offing, it is crucial for the 
Gulf regimes to find new alternative ways to avoid a multidimensional economic 
crisis, hence, the importance of forging economic ties with Israel. In light of their 
sensitive nature as ‘rentier’ states, ensuring strong economies will help the GCC 
regimes better address social dissatisfaction and navigate popular demands for 
political reforms especially after the recent waves of the Arab Spring. 
In the same vein, Ferziger and Bahgat (2020) point out that the GCC states 
could tremendously benefit from cooperation with Israel in the field of agriculture. 
Israel has also one of the most creative and advanced projects in water-management 
and irrigation fields, both sectors the GCC states need to cultivate given the scarcity 
of water in these countries. Jones and Guzansky (2017) point out the continuity of 
Arab-Israeli cooperation in such fields even in times of diplomatic ruckuses. They 
state that even though Oman closed the Israeli trade office that it had opened in 1996, 
it continued to welcome Israeli scientists to the Middle East Desalination Research 
Centre (MEDRC) located in Muscat to tackle the water scarcity from which the 
region suffers. 
To conclude, as demonstrated in the corpus findings, the Trump administration 
stressed that forging and nurturing economic cooperation with Israel will help the 
Arab regimes upgrade their economic sectors, thus helping them generate more 
economic growth and prosperity. The Arab regimes may find it strategic to cooperate 







health, etc. This was evident in the bilateral peace deals of the Abraham Accords. 
Hence, the threat of social discontent, which swept the Middle East in the last decade, 
that could put the legitimacy of the Arab regimes in jeopardy, could be minimized. 
This attests to the relevance of Ryan’s variable of ‘political economy’ in the 
normalization of ties between the Arab regimes and Israel and how the Trump 
administration approached this important factor. In fact, to facilitate economic 
cooperation and the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the Arab 
regimes and Israel, the Trump administration pursued a top-down “outside-in” 
approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as previously discussed. That was 
why the Trump approach constituted a strategic shift in the American foreign policy 
in the Middle East. 
5.4.1.3 The ‘external security’ variable 
According to Ryan, when faced with external threats, regimes tend to reorient 
their foreign policies by forging new alignments or realignment. UAE and Bahrain 
serve as two cases in point. Both are aligning with Israel to confront the external 
menace posed by Iran and its proxies across the Middle East. To put things into 
perspective, over the last two decades, the Iranian regime has tremendously benefited 
from the unstable situation in the Middle East. It took advantage of a post-invasion 
Iraq marked by inter-sectarian rifts, an Arab Spring that sent shockwaves across the 
region, and civil wars in Syria and Yemen to consolidate its influence in the Arab 
world (Dazi-Héni, 2020). In fact, in 2014, Ali Reza Zakani, an Iranian Member of 
Parliament, close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, proclaimed: “Three Arab capitals 







adding that “Sanaa has now become the fourth Arab capital that is on its way to 
joining the Iranian revolution” (The Middle East Monitor, 2014, para. 1). Azodi 
(2020) mentions that certain Iranian officials acknowledge that Iran’s growing foreign 
activities instilled fear and terror in the Arab states and drove them to seek a security 
umbrella in Israel. She cites the tweet of Ali Motahari, a former Iranian MP, who 
writes: 
Aside from Emiratis’ treacherous act, we also deserve some blame. We have 
scared the Arabs and pushed them towards Israel. An example of this is 
storming the Saudi embassy and setting it ablaze. The policy of making Iran 
the enemy has been fruitful. This needs to be remedied. (para. 5) 
As previously discussed, Iran and its allied groups have been systematically 
demonized by the Trump administration which depicted them as an existential threat 
to the external security of the Arab regimes. The Trump administration tapped into the 
fears of the US regional allies of rapprochement with Iran. It alerted them to the grave 
danger of once again appeasing the Iranian regime by repeating the same colossal 
mistakes of the Obama administration should they think to engage with Iran. The 
Trump administration strategically burnt bridges between the Arab regimes and Iran 
while building ones with Israel. It persistently worked to entrench the perception that 
the underlying external security threat facing the Arab regimes emanated from no 
other sources other than Iran and its proxies while pushing the Arab regimes to 
rethink their stance towards Israel. Focusing on the convergence of interests between 
the Arab states and Israel helps the US administration deepen the negative perception 







tends to lock the Arab states into existential binary views—Iran as a destructive and 
revisionist regime and Israel as a status quo power and multi-dimensional potential 
partner. The stance of the Former Minister Anwar Gargash came to prove the 
development of the negative perception of the Iranian regime. In an interview with the 
Associated Press, he remarked that the decades-long Iranian aggression in the region 
has pushed the Arab states to rethink their perception of Israel (cited by Lederer, 
2020). The Trump administration seemed to have capitalized on that perception. 
In a nutshell, branding the Iranian regime as the arch-enemy of the Arab 
regimes and Israel was hoped to drive them closer to each other to form a security 
alignment that fends off the Iranian threat. By demonizing Iran and maintaining the 
confrontational campaign of “Maximum Pressure”, the Trump administration proved 
that Iran and its proxies remain perceived as the real external threat to the security of 
the Arab regimes, despite the dangerous rapprochement previously pursued by the 
Obama administration. That was why the “Maximum Pressure” constituted a strategic 
shift in the American approach towards Iran. 
To conclude, my interpretation suggests that the Trump-era foreign policies 
towards Iran and the Arab-Israeli conflict were approached based on the ‘external 
security’ and ‘political economy’ variables suggested by Ryan’s ‘regime security’ 
theory. In fact, as illustrated in the corpus findings, the “Peace to Prosperity” plan 
nicely encapsulates how these two factors were portrayed by the Trump 
administration as the main two sources of threat to the security of the Arab regimes. It 
says: “the State of Israel is not a threat to the region whatsoever. Economic conditions 







region’s states”. It also stresses that “Integrating Israel into the region will allow it to 
assist across a wide range of economic challenges as well as counter the threats of 
Iran”. In a strategic shift from the previous US approaches to both questions, the 
Trump administration engineered a GCC-Israeli security alignment that would help 
the US rely more on regional allies in confronting regional threats as it recalibrates its 
involvement in the Middle East. 
5.4.2 Implications of Trump-era policies on the geopolitical landscape 
By demonizing Iran, through the confrontational “Maximum Pressure” 
campaign, and bridging the gap between the Arab states and Israel, through a top-
down approach, the Trump administration triggered a transformation in the 
geopolitical landscape in the Middle East. In what follows I enlist the different aspects 
of the possible security alignment between the Arab regimes and Israel. I also discuss 
how tensions in the Persian Gulf may heighten as the Arab-Israeli security alignment 
materializes. 
5.4.2.1 Prospects of an Arab-Israeli security alignment  
Throughout its tenure, the Trump administration worked towards pushing the 
GCC regimes to align with Israel to face the region’s most pressing issues. It rallied 
the GCC rulers to form a security alignment with Israel that collectively confronts the 
Iranian threat to their regimes. Of particular importance was how President Trump, in 
his first trip abroad to the Middle East, signaled that the US will not fight its allies’ 
enemies on their behalf. President Trump noted: “But the nations of the Middle East 
cannot wait for American power to crush this enemy for them. The nations of the 







their countries, and for their children”. Added to that, President Trump expressed his 
intention and did indeed scale back US presence in the Middle East by bringing back 
home US troops from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This implied that the US allies 
needed to rethink their traditional reliance on the US for security and stability in the 
region in the long run. Wechsler (2019) remarks that such declarations did nothing but 
push the Middle Eastern regimes to seek a new security architecture that fills the void 
caused by the US retrenchment. 
Alternatively, the Trump administration, in a visionary and strategic departure 
from the past administrations’ approaches, spurred a geopolitical transformation in the 
Middle East. It bridged the gap between the Arab regimes and Israel by portraying 
Israel as a potential partner and demonizing Iran and its allied groups as the common 
threat to the region. As Arab regimes continue to jump on the train of normalization, 
new security Arab-Israeli alignments are bound to emerge and take shape, so strategic 
to balance against Iran and its proxies in the future. My findings illustrated that the 
normalization of relations between the Arab regimes and Israel will not likely stop at 
the transactional and business level, it will cultivate strategic multi-dimensional 
cooperation, most notably at the security level, so beneficial for both parties in the 
long term. In this respect, in an interview with the Associated Press, Anwar Gargash, 
former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs urged the Israelis to think strategically 
about the normalization of relations between Israel and UAE. He said:  
The only thing I want to say is the more strategic the Israelis look at these 
relationships, the more doors will open to them...If they look at it very 







normalizing relations with many of the Arab countries. (as cited by Lederer, 
2020, para. 3) 
A few days after normalizing ties, according to the official Emirati News 
Agency (WAM), Mossad director Yossi Cohen visited UAE to discuss “cooperation 
in the fields of security” (para. 2) with the UAE’s national security adviser Sheikh 
Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan (Al Jazeera, 2020). The fact that Cohen was the first 
Israeli official to pay a visit to UAE, in addition to the security talks, echoes the 
importance and significance of security cooperation between the two states. In light of 
the security cooperation underscored in the Abraham Accords, it comes as no surprise 
that UAE and Bahrain, and perhaps later the rest of the GCC states, agreed to open 
their ports, airspace, and territories to Israel. While this may take several forms, 
increased security cooperation signals an alignment between the Arab regimes and 
Israel. I adopt the term alignment, rather than alliance, because the former is less 
formal than the latter. Drawing on Snyder’s (1991) work in “Alliances, Balance, and 
Stability”, Ryan (2009) explains that alliances are formal and mutual “promises” 
between states in the field of security and defense such as NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact noting that beyond the Western world, such alliances hardly succeeded. 
Accordingly, Ryan defines alignment as “an informal relationship between two or 
more states, involving expectations of political and economic support that may 
include, but is not restricted to, security affairs” (p. 5). In what follows, I discuss how 
different forms of security arrangements come into play to undergird the Arab-Israel 
security alignment triggered by the strategic shift of the Trump-era foreign policies. 
First, regarding the Israeli presence on the GCC soils, Azodi (2020) suggests 







shores of Iran. Similarly, Jadeh Iran (2020), an online website focusing on Iranian 
affairs, published an Iranian report alerting the Iranian government to the secret aims 
of the UAE-Israel peace agreement which were “clear in the geopolitical sense” (para. 
2). These “undeclared aims” could “lead to the establishment of Israeli military and 
security bases facing Iran” (para. 1), thus moving Israel closer to the Iranian territories 
(as cited by The New Arab Staff, 2020b). 
Second, concerning the security of the waterways, Israel may increase its 
cooperation with the GCC states to better protect their border and maritime activities. 
More protection would be provided for navigation freedom as GCC-Israeli 
cooperation would better control maritime shipping routes, thus thwarting the 
influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) on those areas. In 
this regard, Dazi-Héni (2020) confirms that “The Abraham Accords undoubtedly 
mark a new departure in the region’s geopolitics” since it “allow[s] Israel 
unprecedented access to the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf” (p. 6).  
Third, as far as cooperation in the airspace is concerned, it is likely that Israel 
will use the airspace of the GCC states to strike Iran in case of a serious clash. Totten 
(2016) recalls how Saudi Arabia sided with Israel, albeit implicitly, against Hezbollah 
in the 2006 war. Thus, he expects it, in a scenario of a military confrontation with 
Iran, to allow the Israeli air force to use its air space to attack Iran’s nuclear sites 
following an ancient Arab proverb: “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” (p. 31). 
Saudi Arabia already allowed Israel to use its airspace for commercial flights to UAE 








Fourth, in light of the importance of the security cooperation in the Abraham 
Accords, conducting joint military drills would certainly be among the potential areas 
to test military cooperation between the Arab states and Israel. Bowman and Nagel 
(2020) suggest that Israel could join the formidable yearly Iron Union military 
exercise between the US and UAE and described it as a "promising opportunity" 
(para. 10) in the field of military cooperation. Further, the decision of the US 
Department of Defense to move Israel into the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 
will also pave the way for more military exercises between the Arab states and Israel.  
Fifth, it is thanks to the Abraham Accords that investing in mutual defense 
looks closer and more feasible than ever between the Gulf states and Israel. Knights 
(2020) highlights how the Abraham Accords started to materialize in the military 
collaboration between the signatory parties. He points out the signals conveyed by 
Moshe Patel, head of the Israel Missile Defense Organization, on December 15, 2020, 
who expressed Israel’s interest in collaborating with UAE and Bahrain to further 
develop the missile defense sector that Israel and the US already work on. Knights 
notes that accelerating cooperation in the defense field will help curtail “Iran’s fast-
developing missile, rocket, and drone forces” (p. 1). In this respect, Knights 
recommends that this collaboration “be expanded to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other 
states” which will facilitate the formation of “stronger regional coalitions” whose 
objective is to ensure the “defensive containment of Iran, as opposed to costly and 
destructive debacles like the Yemen war” (p. 1). He stresses that the US, Israel, and 
the Arab allies should double their efforts to address “the urgent need for greater 
defense capabilities” (p. 1), much needed to fill the gap in the defense systems of 







enormous pressure from the rocket attacks fired last December 2020 into the 
American Embassy in Baghdad and warns that “If larger rocket salvoes are launched 
in the future, such defenses would be quickly overwhelmed” (p. 2). With regard to 
Israel, Iran-backed Hezbollah possesses “120,000-150,000 unguided and precision 
rockets”, coupled with Iran’s capabilities to launch “missiles and drone attacks” from 
its territories, Syria, and Iraq, all constitute a challenge to the Israeli defense system. 
The same applies to the UAE which was and still is a potential target of the Houthis 
(p. 2). Besides, Iran has invariably asserted that UAE would be a legitimate target of 
its wide range of weapons. Similarly, Knights recalls how Saudi Arabia suffered from 
the constant Houthi attacks, but also assaults from the Iranian and Iraqi territories, on 
its capital, southern towns, and vital economic facilities, most dangerous of which 
was the Abqaiq attacks in 2019 which paralyzed oil production for a couple of weeks.  
Knights recommends that defense systems be less expensive and more 
efficacious by mobilizing the necessary resources and capabilities that the US allies 
enjoy. He maintains that Israel has considerable hands-on experience in developing 
and operating missile defense systems such as the Iron Dome system used to defend 
its territories. Regarding the Gulf states, Knights views that they “are well-positioned 
to surveil launch areas in Iran and Yemen that Israel cannot easily monitor” (p. 3). In 
a nutshell, one can notice that investment in the defense systems looks appealing for 
all parties and represents a win-win opportunity to better protect their states from the 
threats emanating from Iran and its proxies in the region. 
Sixth, it goes without saying that the Abraham Accords will open the doors for 
Israel to collect extensive information on Iranian activities, especially in the Persian 







UAE and Bahrain, and Israel, but also the remaining GCC states. Rabi and Mueller 
(2017) argue that, for instance, intelligence between Saudi Arabia and Israel 
intensified in the last decades. In their words: “the invasion of Iraq in 2003 gave rise 
to unprecedented levels of tacit security and intelligence cooperation between Israel 
and Saudi Arabia” (p. 576). In the same vein, the online Iranian newspaper Jadeh Iran 
(2020) states that the establishment of diplomatic ties between Israel and UAE puts 
the national security of Iran in jeopardy as the majority of Iran’s ports, oil facilities, 
and nuclear sites are located in the Gulf coast. The report claims that, given the 
geographic proximity of the UAE, the peace agreement would provide Israel with an 
“eye, and perhaps even a hand as well, a few kilometers away from strategic Iranian 
installations” (as cited by The New Arab Staff, 2020, para. 7). 
Seventh, cooperation in the security field with the new anti-Iran coalition 
could help the US further share the security burden with its allies and partners 
consistent with its retrenchment strategy in the region. Knights (2020) remarks that 
“Despite their recent economic challenges, these [Gulf] states are still quite wealthy 
and could offset some of the $3-4 billion in missile defense research and development 
costs that the United States undertakes each year” (p. 3). 
Eight, technology is just another field in which the Arab states could benefit 
enormously from Israel to maximize the security of their regimes. There is no doubt 
that Israel enjoys unparalleled technological progress in the Middle East. Given that it 
is the leading power in technological innovation, as underscored by Ferziger and 
Bahgat (2020), the Gulf states do not wish to miss the opportunity to strike a 
partnership with Israel to enhance their security apparatus, particularly in the cyber 







vulnerabilities of the GCC states in protecting themselves against the mounting 
malicious cyber activities that target both their public and private sectors. It maintains 
that the magnitude of cyber attacks on the GCC states reflects the daunting 
cybersecurity challenges and the need to invest in this field particularly for Kuwait, 
Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. Zilber (2019) affirms that “Over the past decade, growing 
military threats from Iran, its proxies, and Sunni jihadist groups like the Islamic State 
pushed Israel and the Gulf states into even closer security cooperation” (p. 1-2), most 
notably in the cyber security field.  
Ryan’s (2009, 2015) ‘regime security’ approach seems to be yet again 
insightful when it comes to understanding the Arab-Israeli security alignment affected 
by the Trump administration. As underscored by Ryan (2009, p. 14), “Alignments are 
external solutions to both domestic and regional security problems”. Ryan’s approach 
proved it has considerable empirical grounds in my research findings and analysis. It 
helps explore how the Trump-era foreign policies triggered a geopolitical 
transformation in the Middle East through the alignment of the GCC regimes with 
Israel. When these regimes externally align with Israel, this could be beneficial at the 
domestic and regional levels. Domestically, they could benefit mostly from the new 
economic ties with Israel to better diversify their political economy. In addition to 
that, they could benefit from Israel’s technological prowess to surveil and silence 
political opposition, so important for the stability of their regimes. Regionally, they 
could better confront the external threat of Iran and its allied groups. Thus, it could be 
inferred that a ‘regime security’ approach may have shaped the shrewd shift in 







Whilst Odeh (2020) is right to argue that the transformations the Middle East 
is witnessing “was facilitated by the weakening of former giants” (para. 6) such as 
Egypt and Iraq, my research findings suggested that the Trump administration 
embarked on a strategic shift in the American foreign policy that also led to this 
burgeoning security alignment against Iran. This was evidenced; first, in one of the 
pillars of the “Maximum Pressure” campaign as it aimed to “revitalize our [the US] 
traditional alliances and regional partnerships as bulwarks against Iranian 
subversion”. Second, the “Peace to Prosperity” plan aimed at bridging the gap 
between the Arab states and Israel by emphasizing that “previously unimaginable 
opportunities and alliances are emerging”, so important to confront the threat posed 
by Iran. 
Equally important, my findings and analysis are consistent with Totten’s 
(2016) claim that, to the surprise of so many, the Arab Sunni states are aligning with 
Israel to confront Iran. They are also consistent with Azodi’s (2020) argument that 
claims that the burgeoning alliance between the Arab states and Israel can potentially 
alter the balance of power in the region in favor of the US and its allies. Further, 
Odeh’s (2020) view lends support to my analysis of the relevance of Ryan’s regime 
security approach. She underscores that UAE is bent on upending the influence 
stemming from both the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the Iranian regime. To 
achieve its aims, UAE rulers opted for alignment with the US and Israel to strengthen 
the fortress of their regimes against what they perceive as internal and external 
security threats. She writes: “The priorities of Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) were 
clear: confront Iran and crush the Muslim Brotherhood and do it by allying with the 







Guzansky and Marshall (2020) confirm that the insecurity of the Gulf regimes 
is “a motivating factor” (p. 382) in reaching the Abraham Accords. For them, a 
number of reasons pushed these states to reconsider their political and strategic 
calculations. First, the Gulf states were concerned that, in case Biden was selected, a 
new administration would “implement much stricter policies than the Trump 
administration regarding human rights and regional arms transfers”, in addition to the 
possibility of taking “a softer approach on Iran” (p. 382). Second, these Gulf states 
put “the continuation of America’s commitment to regional security” (p. 382) into 
question at a certain point, mainly due to the retrenchment policies of both the Obama 
and Trump administrations. Third, the deep division among the Palestinians continues 
to reverberate across the Arabian Peninsula in terms of who should be supported, 
Gaza under the control of Hamas or the West Bank under the control of the 
Palestinian Authority. Fourth, the need to confront the growing Iranian threat 
constitutes a common denominator between some of the Arab states and Israel. For 
Guzansky and Marshall, “the Accords underscore the lengths to which some Arab 
states are willing to go to counter Tehran’s increased regional aggression and 
influence” (p. 382).  
Allied with Ryan’s framework of ‘regime security’ is the thesis put forward by 
Jones and Guzansky (2017) who argue that Israel and Gulf Arab states yearn to jointly 
form what they call a “Tacit Security Regime” (TSR) (p. 399), driven mainly by the 
desire to curb Iran’s growing threat in the region yet without compromising the 
internal political constraints. An openly explicit alignment with Israel might be 
domestically costly for certain regimes, thus working behind closed doors would be 







its proxies but also to expand cooperation in different fields. Jones and Guzansky 
maintain that Israel and the GCC states face three core challenges: Iran’s growing 
destabilizing behavior, which constitutes “The dominant variable that has pushed the 
Gulf states and Israel toward a TSR”, radical jihad, and American disengagement 
from the region. The construct of the TSR, in the eyes of its theorists, draws on two 
underpinning tenets. The first one is that geographical proximity is not deterministic 
of the in-depth cooperation between Israel and the GCC states. The second one is that 
this TSR is essentially based on a mutual “shared perception of threat” (p. 407), that is 
confronting the Iranian menace, and not other inter-state issues. While the “Tacit 
Security Regime” appears to materialize thanks to the Abraham Accords and the 
UAE-Bahrain-Israel alignment, one observes that the Trump-era normalization of ties 
between the Arab states and Israel did not spark domestic opposition as Jones and 
Guzansky may have expected. Indeed, Fiore (2020) states that there are “clear signs 
of an atmosphere for a warm peace developing: Bahrainis, Emiratis, and Israelis are 
excited about their joint peacemaking project” (p. 2), to the contrary of what was 
anticipated by Jones and Guzansky in terms of domestic opposition. 
For its part, given the burgeoning Arab-Israeli security alignment, Iran is 
expected to further strengthen its “Axis of Resistance”, but also to look for other 
allies. Here, it may turn for Turkey as a strategic ally. Indeed, Azodi (2020) suggests 
that normalization of ties between Israel and UAE may push Iran towards Turkey 
which, in its turn, was scathingly critical of the UAE decision. She points out that 
Turkey has had strained relations with Saudi Arabia, Israel, and even the US. 
Regarding Saudi Arabia, Turkish relations with the kingdom further plummeted with 







Prince went as far as to include Turkey in the “contemporary triangle of evil” (para. 7) 
along with Iran and its proxies in the region. In relation to Israel, at the time of her 
writing, Azodi is right to mention that Turkey does not have an Ambassador in Israel. 
Indeed, Turkey’s diplomatic feud with Israel heightened in 2018 following Israel’s 
“deadly attacks” on the Gaza Strip. It is worth remembering that Turkish-Israel 
diplomatic ties were particularly severed in 2010 following Israel’s attacks on the 
Turkish flotilla while on its way with aid to Gaza. Yet more recently, in December 
2020, Turkey appointed a new ambassador (Al Jazeera, 2020, para. 2). With regard to 
Turkish-US relations, the US vehemently opposed Turkey’s plan to purchase the S-
400 Russian air defense systems (Azodi, 2020).  
In light of this multifaceted security cooperation, some scholars and analysts 
expect the Arab-Israeli alignment would result in a more formal formation of an Arab 
Sunni-Israeli coalition or alliance as suggested by (Azodi, 2020; Knights, 2020; Odeh, 
2020; Totten, 2016). As shown in the corpus results, the Trump administration itself 
used the terms “coalition” and “alliance” several times. Yet while this has not 
officially seen the light yet, one should note that the past experiences of the Arab 
attempts to forge formal alliances or coalitions were not successful, to say the least. 
The experience of what Walt describes as an “ill-fated” Baghdad Pact in 1955 attests 
to the limits of alliance formation in the Arab world. The alliance consisted of Iraq, 
Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Great Britain, and the US and aimed to contain the influence 
of the Soviet Union. Yet the pact was faced with sheer resistance from certain Arab 
states, especially Egypt (Walt, 1987, p. 58). Under the Trump administration, in April 
2019, the US announced the Saudi-led initiative of creating the Middle East Strategic 







Cooperation Council, Jordan, and Egypt. While some regarded it as an ‘Arab NATO’, 
Mick Mulroy, the former deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East, 
commented that MESA is not similar to NATO in that there is no ‘Article 5’ which 
states that member states will defend other NATO members if they are attacked. He 
explains that MESA will help the US work closely with the GCC +2 on stabilizing the 
region (Lopez, 2019). Indeed, MESA could be regarded as a US effort to contain Iran 
in the region, although the alliance has not yet been formalized given the past rifts in 
the GCC, the boycott of Qatar, and the divergent views of these countries on a litany 
of issues in the Middle East. It should be noted both Oman and Qatar are already not 
antagonistic to Iran. Equally important, Egypt has already pulled out from the talks 
due to the lack of vision of the MESA which raises serious questions about the 
prospect of such an alliance (Kalin & Landay, 2019). In a nutshell, Ryan (2009, 2015) 
is right to maintain that the Arab system of alliance is quite different from the 
Western experience as the empirical reality illustrated with the past experiences. Yet 
given the demonization of Iran and the mobilization of US allies against it, the Trump 
administration may have strengthened the security alignment between the Arab states 
and Israel to unprecedented levels of security cooperation.  
5.4.2.2 The Persian Gulf as the geopolitical ring  
As a result of the Arab-Israeli security alignment, the geopolitical struggle in 
the Persian Gulf will likely mount between the anti-Iran Arab regimes, the US, and 
Israel, on the one hand, and Iran and its proxies, on the other. On January 15, 2021, 
the Defense Department announced that it will move Israel from the European 
Command (EUCOM) to CENTCOM. In clarifying the rationale behind such a 







“a strategic opportunity…to align key U.S. partners against shared threats in the 
Middle East” (as cited by Orion & Montgomery, 2020, para. 1).  
In light of the GCC-Israeli security alignment and the recent rearrangement of 
CENTCOM, anti-Iran Arab regimes would move closer than ever to Israel. The latter 
could kill two birds with one stone. First, it would build stronger relations with the 
Arab states that have already normalized ties with them. Second, it could move closer 
to the ones that still reject it. That is, it will be a golden opportunity for Israel to 
normalize militarily with the rest of the Arab regimes under the umbrella of 
CENTCOM. The decision by the Trump administration to move Israel into 
CENTCOM was undoubtedly illustrative of the geopolitical changes taking place in 
the Middle East. In addition to that, since its national security is now in peril, it is 
expected that Iran would take advantage of the Abraham Accords to justify its 
activities in the region (Ferziger & Bahgat, 2020; Guzansky & Marshall, 2020). 
Indeed, Iran’s concerns will heighten in the face of increased security cooperation 
between the new partners in the region. 
Azodi (2016) states that the Persian Gulf has historically played a pivotal role 
in the national security of Iran. Its strategic importance, in addition to the historical 
aspect, emanates from Iran’s costly wars of the past. Iran learned from its mistakes 
during its war with Iraq in the 1980s, in that the Arab Sunni states will most likely 
side with any Arab adversary facing Iran, “Therefore, Tehran’s security calculations, 
controlling the waterway is existential to Iran’s security” (para. 2). Drawing on the 
importance of the Persian Gulf, no wonder then that Iran embarked on sweeping 








Furthermore, the Persian Gulf is vitally important for the Iranian economy. 
Most of Iran’s oil exports pass through the Persian routes in addition to the fact that 
some of Iran’s major oil facilities are situated along the Persian shores. Equally 
important, the Persian Gulf represents the sole “buffer zone” (para. 3) that shields Iran 
from its southern Arab Sunni states with which Iran has been historically at odds. 
Moreover, in case of a full-scale war, Iran’s control over the Persian Gulf will give it 
greater leverage should a serious confrontation erupt. Iran has frequently threatened to 
block the Strait of Hormuz in an attempt to show that it could “shock the international 
oil markets by disrupting the shipment of oil from the region” (para. 3). Last but not 
least, Azodi stresses that identity politics play a key role in managing the Persian Gulf 
for the Iranians. The Persian character is asserted in the management of the waterway. 
This area is also protected by and under the control of the IRGCN which is, in its turn, 
under the control of hardliners that oppose any form of détente with the US. In this 
respect, Vaughan (2016) notes that hazardous incidents between the American forces 
and their Iranian counterparts doubled in 2016 (as cited in Azodi, 2016), let alone, one 
wonders, with the Israeli access to the area. 
Overall, the Arab-Israeli security alignment revolutionizes the geopolitical 
setting in the Middle East. It also increases the likelihood of balancing against Iran 
and its proxies in the region. Given Iran’s obsession with its hegemonic control of the 
Persian Gulf as well as its growing influence in the region, the competing powers in 
this body of water, and the broader region, are prone to more tensions, 








Yet while Ryan’s regime security appears to be illuminating in developing 
insights into how Trump’s legacy affected geopolitical transformation in the Middle 
East, laying the ground for a strategic security alignment between the Arab states and 
Israel seems also to slightly fall in line with the recommendation of Mearsheimer and 
Walt (2016, p. 2) and Walt (2018, p. 14) to go back to a strategy of  ‘Offshore 
Balancing’ in that the US should “pass the buck” to regional actors to maintain the 
balance of power in their region. In the words of Mearsheimer and Walt (2016, p. 2), 
“Washington should pass the buck to regional powers, as they have a far greater 
interest in preventing any state from dominating them”.  
Drawing on the underpinnings of ‘Offshore Balancing’, my research 
demonstrated that the Trump administration partially set the stage for the return to this 
strategy. In addition to the fact that the administration reduced the number of US 
troops in Iraq, Syria as well as Afghanistan, it drew the Arabs states and Israel closer 
to each other and encouraged them to cooperate in bilateral and regional security 
affairs.  
Similarly, the analysis put forward in this thesis research lends support to 
Yom’s (2020) argument that the US is undergoing a hegemonic decline in the Middle 
East initiated by the Obama administration and sustained by the Trump 
administration. He expects that the US will adopt an ‘Offshore Balancing’. Sharing 
the burden of checking Iran’s growing influence with US allies will help the US 
continue to disengage from the Middle East and focus more on China. In fact, Yom is 
right to anticipate that the US will change its strategic posture in the region. The 
Trump administration rejected the Bush administration’s ‘Liberal Hegemony’ strategy 







the long term. It is the GCC-Israeli security alignment empowered by the Trump 
administration that helped paved the way for a more effective reliance on US allies in 
the region in the future. Finally, in line with my findings and discussion, Dazi-Héni 
(2020) views the rapprochement between the Gulf states and Israel as conducive to a 
“new geopolitical axis of Israel and the Gulf states” (p. 7) which the US hopes to be 
effective not only in countering Iran’s influence but also in containing the Chinese 






















Chapter Six: Conclusion 
This thesis examines Trump’s legacy in the Middle East. In it, I argue that the 
Trump administration embarked on a strategic shift in American foreign policy which 
affected the geopolitical dynamics in the region. Firstly, I explore this shift that 
characterized the policies towards Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I conclude 
that the “Maximum Pressure” campaign and the “Peace to Prosperity” plan were both 
distinct approaches marked with a heavy dose of unilateralism that defied sometimes 
international norms. Secondly, I also explore the implications of such policies on the 
geopolitical landscape in the region. I conclude that the strategic shift in Trump-era 
foreign policies engineered a potential security alignment between the GCC states 
(UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, albeit secretly) and Israel as the US adjusts its 
commitment to the region.  
My inferences are drawn from my empirical findings and evidence. I 
conducted systematic research that analyzed a corpus representative of different 
genres of Trump-era foreign policy documents. I used Quirkos, a qualitative content 
analysis software, to code and categorize the data. To interpret the results, I applied 
Ryan’s ‘regime security’ theory on the Trump administration’s approach towards the 
Iranian and Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Drawing on Ryan’s ‘regime security’ theoretical framework, I found that the 
Trump administration tapped into the insecurity of the Arab regimes in the Middle 
East. It played into the ‘external security’ variable by demonizing Iran and pursuing a 
“Maximum Pressure” campaign. It also played into the ‘political economy’ factor by 
bridging the gap between the Arab regimes and Israel and encouraging economic 







Israeli-Palestinian conflict embodied in the “Peace to Prosperity” plan. Consequently, 
the Trump administration managed to push for a GCC-Israeli security alignment. This 
was implied in the security cooperation promoted in the Abraham Accords as well as 
in the actions and declarations of officials. Indeed, this could take the form of 
cooperation in the field of intelligence, military training, defense, energy, or still even 
the possibility of establishing Israeli military presence in the GCC states, for instance. 
Based on this potential multidimensional security cooperation, the Trump 
administration’s approach and endeavors to sponsoring such an alignment were 
strategically important and in line with the US disengagement from the Middle East. 
Differently put, altering the geopolitical landscape may have facilitated the reliance 
on US allies to maintain the balance of power against Iran’s growing influence in the 
region, and thus the possibility of returning to a strategy of “Offshore Balancing” in 
the long run. While the shift in the American foreign policy was a thoughtful 
approach crafted by the Trump administration, regional transformation was 
envisioned at the expense of Palestinian rights. This shift also provoked acts of “Soft 
Balancing” against the US on the world stage. 
6.1 Research Limitations 
Given the limitations of the Qualitative Content Analysis method, findings and 
discussion in this thesis may be prone to unintentional bias. Therefore, I first 
endeavored to make this research as systematic as possible by setting well-defined 
and clear criteria in the research Methodology. Secondly, I tried to support my 
findings with as much evidence as possible from the corpus which ended up 
somewhat in a long Results chapter. Thirdly, due to the magnitude of data, random 







allowed more focus on the analysis and interpretation of data. Fourthly, the 
correlation between the Trump-era foreign policies towards Iran and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict may need to be approached quantitatively to prove the correlation 
suggested in my interpretation. 
6.2 Recommendations 
Given that Ryan’s ‘regime security’ theory is based on insights into both 
international relations and comparative politics, it would be illuminating to study how 
the Arab regimes framed the external alignment with Israel to their people and which 
Ryan’s variable was used the most by the regime elites. In other words, Ryan’s 
framework could be further tested to examine how the Arab regimes approached their 
alignment with Israel. Further, in light of the strategic shift argument advanced in this 
thesis and given the lack of previous diplomatic experience by President Trump and 
scores of his appointees, most notably former Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Jared 
Kushner, it would be interesting to know how the “principal-agent problem” 
manifested itself and addressed when promoting and executing Trump-era foreign 
policies. In other words, researchers could investigate how the foreign policy 
establishment dealt with the way the Trump administration was strategizing 
concerning the most pressing and complicated issues in the Middle East: Iran’s 
growing influence and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Moreover, since my data 
focused exclusively on public documents regarding the Trump-era foreign policies in 
the Middle East, researchers may find it interesting to investigate the internal 
dynamics of the Trump’s team as far as the internal policy disputes were concerned. 
In particular to the Iranian question, it would be illuminating to scrutinize how the 







they affected the policy shift that marked American foreign policy towards the Iranian 
nuclear program. Last but not least, given that the Biden administration expressed its 
deep interest and willingness to revitalize the JCPOA, Turkey is developing warmer 
relations with Al-Sisi regime, and the Arab Quartet (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and 
Egypt) have already normalized ties with Qatar, it would be interesting to examine 
whether the Biden administration deems alignment politics very important in 
approaching American foreign policy in the Middle East as was the case for its 
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